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THE INTERBELLUM CONSTITUTION: 
FEDERALISM IN THE LONG FOUNDING 
MOMENT 
Alison L. LaCroix* 
Today, the mechanism of the spending power helps to drive the gears of the 
modern federal machine. But early nineteenth-century constitutional debates 
demonstrate that the spending power is essentially a work-around, and a recent 
one at that—a tool by which Congress achieves certain political and legal ends 
while respecting the formal boundaries set by Article I and the Tenth Amendment. 
The “interbellum” period between 1815 and 1861 was enormously significant for 
American constitutional law, in particular the constellation of related doctrines 
concerning congressional power that we now place under the general heading of 
“federalism”: the spending power, the enumerated powers of Article I, and the 
anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. Political and legal actors 
in the early nineteenth century believed they lived in a long Founding moment in 
which the fundamental terms of the federal-state relationship were still open to 
debate. Constitutional scholars have mistakenly overlooked the constitutional 
creativity of the period. As a normative matter, I argue for an approach to mod-
ern constitutional interpretation that recognizes the ever-changing nature of the 
landscape of constitutional permissibility, and that offers documentary evidence 
of the precise contours of that change. Studying the evolution of the spending 
power over time, especially where the text itself remains constant, demonstrates 
that ideas about federal structure are not fixed. Therefore, constitutional federal-
ism itself is not fixed—a particularly important insight in an area of constitution-
al doctrine that is dominated by originalist approaches. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Time and experience have verified to a demonstration, the public utility of 
internal improvements. That the poorest and most thinly populated countries 
would be greatly benefitted by the opening of good roads, and in the clearing 
of navigable streams within their limits, is what no person will deny. . . . The 
only objection is to paying for them; and the objection to paying arises from 
the want of ability to pay. 
 —Abraham Lincoln, 18321 
 
The constitutional landscape of the early nineteenth century, roughly be-
tween the end of the War of 1812 and the beginning of the Civil War, was dra-
matically different from that of the twenty-first, or even the twentieth, century. 
Even in the realm of textual provisions that have not changed since the 1790s, 
such as Article I’s enumeration of Congress’s powers or the Tenth Amend-
ment’s reservation of powers to the states and the people, the foundational as-
sumptions—and the resulting worries and preoccupations—of what this Article 
terms the “interbellum” period proceeded from premises that must be under-
stood as distinct and to some degree alien from modern ones. The constitutional 
text is the same, but the modes of interpretation that contemporaries used were 
different, as were the basic questions they were asking the text to answer. The 
words of Article I and the Tenth Amendment have not changed, but the sur-
rounding universe of constitutional possibility has.2  
Given these differences, why are nineteenth-century constitutional debates 
relevant to modern constitutional thought? Because the landscape of constitu-
tional possibility is perpetually changing, and the change in each moment in-
 
 1. A. Lincoln, Letter to the People of Sangamo County, SANGAMO J. (Ill.), Mar. 15, 
1832, at 2, reprinted in THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 3, 4 (Richard N. 
Current ed., 1967). 
 2. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2051 
(2014) (discussing the structural and doctrinal significance for federalism of changing theo-
ries of Congress’s powers under Article I). 
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forms, and indeed shapes, the contours of the constitutional landscape in subse-
quent moments. Yet the landscape of each remains distinct, and in some cases 
appears incompatible, when one attempts to reconcile cases and doctrines 
across eras. Early nineteenth-century Americans exemplified this point. Their 
writings routinely expressed both a sense of vigorous participation in the 
founding of the Republic and a gnawing worry that they had been born too late, 
and too undistinguished, to wear that mantle comfortably.3 They viewed them-
selves as both a special cohort of energetic enactors of their forebears’ plans 
and a lesser generation of Founders manqués.4 
This point is a historical one—it attempts to explain the actions and moti-
vations of historical actors. But concerns of historiography and constitutional 
interpretation also offer important reasons to examine the early nineteenth cen-
tury. From a historiographical perspective, focusing on the competing narra-
tives that scholars have offered, the period is ripe for reexamination. Many of 
the dominant accounts are several decades old, or they pay insufficient atten-
tion to constitutional thought. Instead, they emphasize political or economic 
factors: the “age of Jackson”;5 the “market revolution”;6 the “rise of American 
democracy”;7 the “revolution of communications.”8 These stories fail to recog-
 
 3. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Lawyer’s Library in the Early American Republic, in 
SUBVERSION AND SYMPATHY: GENDER, LAW, AND THE BRITISH NOVEL 251, 254-56 (Martha 
C. Nussbaum & Alison L. LaCroix eds., 2013). 
 4. The youthful utterances of interbellum individuals who later became prominent 
politicians and jurists display a range of emotions, from resigned nostalgia to frustrated cos-
mopolitanism. In 1838, Abraham Lincoln told his audience at the Young Men’s Lyceum of 
Springfield, Illinois, that “the scenes of the revolution” would soon “fade upon the memory 
of the world, and grow more and more dim by the lapse of time. . . . At the close of that 
struggle, nearly every adult male had been a participator in some of its scenes . . . . But those 
histories are gone.” Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Springfield Young Men’s Lyce-
um (Jan. 27, 1838), in THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 1, at 11, 
20. More violent emotion can be found in a letter from the eighteen-year-old Joseph Story, 
whose request for his Harvard College friend Samuel Fay to send his views on Rousseau 
concluded, “Oh Fay! conceive me in Marblehead, and you must know that I am wretched.” 
Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel Fay (Sept. 6, 1798), as reprinted in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS 
OF JOSEPH STORY 75, 76 (William W. Story ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 
1851). On early nineteenth-century Americans’ complex attitudes toward themselves vis-à-
vis their forebears, see LaCroix, supra note 3, at 254-56 (describing interbellum Americans’ 
ambivalence toward their Revolutionary predecessors). See generally JOYCE APPLEBY, 
INHERITING THE REVOLUTION: THE FIRST GENERATION OF AMERICANS (2000) (discussing the 
attitudes of the “first generation” of postcolonial Americans). The paradigmatic example of 
the anxious inheritor, albeit from a few decades later, is Henry Adams. See HENRY ADAMS, 
THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 3-4 (1918). 
 5. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945). 
 6. See CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-
1846 (1991); see also Daniel Feller, The Market Revolution Ate My Homework, 25 REVS. 
AM. HIST. 408, 408 (1997) (book review) (noting that “[t]he idea of a nineteenth-century 
market revolution is now all the rage” and questioning whether the idea can bear the analyti-
cal weight ascribed to it). 
 7. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 
(2006). 
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nize one of the most significant markers of the era: the relentless focus of legal 
elites, politicians, and ordinary people on the Constitution. This interbellum pe-
riod witnessed the emergence of the Constitution as the preeminent organizing 
lens through which Americans viewed political and legal questions.9 One rea-
son for the period’s relative neglect in legal history is the emphasis of constitu-
tional law scholarship on the Founding period and Reconstruction, which has 
meant that the period between those watershed events has not received due at-
tention. 
But this neglect is misplaced. The early nineteenth century is enormously 
significant for American constitutional law, and in particular for the constella-
tion of related doctrines concerning congressional power that we now place un-
der the general heading of “federalism”: the spending power and the 
anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.10 The period between 
roughly 1817 and 1851 witnessed a series of sustained and contentious public 
debates about the federal government’s power to fund public works projects—
“internal improvements” in the parlance of the day. These projects included 
roads, canals, harbors, lighthouses, and, later, railroads.11 The central issue was 
the proper scope of Congress’s power in relation to the states in the federal sys-
 
 8. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 1 (2007). 
 9. For a related point regarding the Civil War, see Arthur Bestor, The American Civil 
War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 327, 328 (1964). 
 10. On the reemergence of judicial federalism, see ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE 
TUG OF WAR WITHIN 97 (2012) (discussing the emergence of “New Federalism” theories, 
“first as a political movement in the 1970s and 1980s, and then as the judicial revolution of 
the 1990s”). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist 
Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 429 (2002) (noting widespread con-
temporary agreement “that the Supreme Court has an agenda of promoting constitutional 
federalism”); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and 
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2182-83 (1998) (outlining and critiquing arguments for 
“judicial enforcement of federalism constraints on national power” and advocating a more 
“process-based” and flexible approach); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 130 (2001) (describing the Rehnquist 
Court’s “reinvigoration of judicially enforced federalism”); Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering 
and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1648-50 (2006) (de-
scribing the benefits of federalism); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federal-
isms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 51-64 (2004) (evaluating the Court’s treatment of “the values that 
motivate our attachment to federalism in the first place”).  
 11. See CARTER GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND 
RAILROADS, 1800-1890 (1960) [hereinafter GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION] (discuss-
ing the roles played by various levels of government in transportation projects); JOHN 
LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF 
POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 2-3 (2001) (examining the conse-
quences of public and private development for republicanism); 4 GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, 
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 1815-
1860, at 388-98 (1951) (analyzing industrialization and structural economic development in 
the period); Carter Goodrich, National Planning of Internal Improvements, 63 POL. SCI. Q. 
16, 16-18 (1948) [hereinafter Goodrich, National Planning] (discussing internal improve-
ments programs as precursors to twentieth-century economic planning).  
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tem. Unlike recent challenges to federal regulation that arguably interfere with 
state sovereignty,12 however, the nineteenth-century controversy was not 
framed in terms of the states’ power to resist encroachments by Congress. Ra-
ther, the debate turned on an entirely different conception of state sovereignty 
from the one employed in modern case law—a conception with equally firm 
roots in the Founding period.  
 As I will demonstrate, the principal factors in much of the Supreme Court’s 
modern federalism jurisprudence were largely absent from, or irrelevant to, the 
debates over the practical meaning of federalism in the early nineteenth centu-
ry.13 The assumptions of unwaivable, monolithic state sovereignty and perpet-
ual, systemic federal-state tension that have underpinned the majority opinions 
in many of the Court’s federalism cases since the 1980s are difficult to trace to 
the Founding period or the early nineteenth century. As the controversy over 
internal improvements illustrates, crucial interbellum constitutional debates 
about federalism unfolded in the political branches: Congress, the presidency, 
and the state legislatures. At issue was the scope of legislative power. Moreo-
ver, the debates included the following key themes: state consent; distinctions 
among Congress’s powers to appropriate funds for internal improvements, to 
execute the improvements itself, and to transfer the public lands to the states for 
the purposes of executing the improvements; and the role of the federal gov-
ernment as proprietor of the public lands.  
Today, the mechanism of the spending power drives essential gears of the 
federal machine.14 The debates over internal improvements offer a nineteenth-
century lens on that power that highlights the differences between interbellum 
and millennial constitutional thought. The internal improvements controversy is 
thus both analogous and disanalogous to modern debates on the practical im-
plementation of federalism principles. As I will show, interbellum constitution-
al thought was generally wary of consolidated federal power over public works 
projects, preferring instead to structure such projects as cooperative federal-
state efforts. In contrast, modern constitutional law doctrine and federalism 
commentary often take the opposite approach: the federal government’s enu-
merated powers under Article I, where appropriate, are the preferred structural 
 
 12. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992). 
 13. As I have argued elsewhere, federalism also had a distinctly different meaning in 
the Founding period from the meaning that is often ascribed to it today. See ALISON L. 
LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 220 (2010) (“The federal 
idea . . . is an intellectual artifact, not a transcendent or timeless idea that has always hovered 
around waiting to be applied to a particular political project.”). 
 14. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1911, 1918 (1995); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Fed-
eralism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 86; Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to 
Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 109-10 (2012); see also Ruth Mason, Federalism and the 
Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975 (2011) (examining Congress’s regulatory deployment 
of the taxing power and its implications). 
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route for such projects, and indirect routes via state cooperation are disfa-
vored.15 As an interpretive matter, to the extent that modern case law relies on 
a particular substantive concept of federalism that has been consistent since the 
Founding, the internal improvements example urges us to rethink that notion. 
Since the earliest days of the Republic, federalism has been an unstable and 
contested concept, worked out through the meshing of theory and practice.16 
By highlighting nineteenth-century understandings of the spending power, the 
internal improvements debate demonstrates the dynamic nature of federalism in 
practice.  
 As the Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions demonstrate, a version 
of state consent continues to be relevant to conditional spending programs, in-
sofar as the Court is now willing to police the boundary between a conditional 
and a coercive program.17 With the return of coercion to the center of the 
spending power analysis, consent is still somewhere in the background of fed-
eralism case law. But the current Court’s renewed emphasis on coercion is dis-
tinct from early nineteenth-century commentators’ focus on state consent. In 
short, the post-National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) 
coercion inquiry is simply not the same as the interbellum consent inquiry. To-
day, we do not think of consent as having much to do with, or any significant 
bearing on, Congress’s direct regulatory power under Article I. To the extent 
that recent federalism doctrine focuses on coercion, the inquiry is confined to 
conditional spending programs—i.e., bargains with the states, often in situa-
tions in which Congress lacks the power to regulate directly under Article I. In 
the early nineteenth century, by contrast, the issue of state consent was closely 
 
 15. See, e.g., Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003) (upholding a 
federal statute requiring states to disclose certain accident reports and safety data under the 
commerce power, without reaching the issue of the spending power, on the theory that the 
statute “aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protection for 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce” and thus fit squarely within Congress’s power 
under the Commerce Clause); Printz, 521 U.S. at 933; New York, 505 U.S. at 149. Here a 
distinction must be drawn between the Court’s doctrine and the practical realities of federal-
ism on the ground, as recent important work on cooperative federalism and concurrent power 
demonstrates. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Feder-
alism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258-59 (2009) (examining states’ role in defining federalism by 
resisting federal policy); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpreta-
tion: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 
534, 537 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism] (positing that “every branch 
of state government is squarely in the midst of creating, implementing, and interpreting fed-
eral statutory law”); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2002 
(2014) (arguing that “Congress [is] our primary source of federalism”). Moreover, the size of 
the Article I regulatory channel at any given doctrinal moment is a separate issue. 
 16. See Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History: A 
Reply to Gordon Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 733 (2011). 
 17. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-04 (holding that the Medicaid expansion in the Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA) “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion” 
because “[i]n this case the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than 
‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head” (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 
175) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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tied to Congress’s primary powers over commerce,18 taxing and spending,19 
post offices and post roads,20 and the public lands.21 Even though NFIB re-
turned coercion to the center of the conditional spending inquiry, state consent 
is still not a defense for Congress against an alleged violation of state sover-
eignty under the Tenth Amendment.22 Rather, recent case law recognizes the 
role of consent only by searching for its opposite, coercion. Early nineteenth-
century federalism doctrine thus differed from the modern version in two im-
portant ways. First, interbellum federalism tied the consent inquiry to direct 
congressional regulation as well as to conditional spending programs. Second, 
interbellum federalism did states the courtesy of defining consent capaciously, 
instead of focusing obsessively on the potential coercive effects of congres-
sional regulation. In these vital respects, the landscape of federalism looked 
very different in the early nineteenth century from how it looks today. 
But this story is much more than a plea for recognizing contingency or ap-
preciating a path not taken. As a historical matter, I contend that political and 
legal actors in the early nineteenth century believed themselves to be living in 
what I refer to as a “long Founding moment,” in which the fundamental terms 
of the federal-state relationship were still open to debate. As a historiographical 
matter, I posit that scholars have mistakenly overlooked the constitutional crea-
tivity of the period. As a matter of constitutional interpretation, I argue for an 
approach that recognizes the ever-changing nature of the landscape of constitu-
tional permissibility, and that offers documentary evidence of the precise con-
tours of that change with respect to the spending power.  
The spending power, in both its interbellum and millennial versions, is es-
sentially a work-around—a tool by which Congress achieves certain political 
and legal ends while respecting the formal boundaries set by Article I and the 
Tenth Amendment.23 In keeping with the changing nature of those boundaries 
as limned by the Court, the legislative work-around also changes.24 Studying 
the changes to the work-around over time, especially where the text itself re-
mains constant, demonstrates that ideas about federal structure are not fixed. 
Therefore, constitutional federalism itself is not fixed. Comparing a particular 
doctrine across time offers insight into the path of constitutional change by re-
 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 19. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 20. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 21. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 22. See id. amend. X. 
 23. See LaCroix, supra note 2, at 2045-51 (discussing the doctrinal and structural rela-
tionships between Article I and the Tenth Amendment). 
 24. Mark Tushnet describes “[c]onstitutional workarounds” as situations in which “the 
Constitution is in some sense at war with itself: One part of the text prohibits something, 
other parts of the text permit it, and the Constitution itself does not appear to give either part 
priority over the other.” Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 
1503-04 (2009) (footnote omitted). Work-arounds can “occur when there is political pressure 
to accomplish a goal blocked by parts of the Constitution’s text.” Id. at 1504. 
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vealing what arguments are, and what arguments are not, part of the Constitu-
tion at any given moment. 
I. THE MODERN SPENDING POWER 
Imagine that a majority of representatives in Congress settles on a plan to 
build a new national highway system. Some states already have adequate roads 
that can be incorporated into the new system, but others have decrepit high-
ways that must be improved in order to accommodate the most up-to-date 
cars—electric, perhaps, or self-driving. Those states’ legislatures are dominated 
by politicians who oppose federal funding for state public works projects and 
who endorse a narrow view of congressional power. These state politicians also 
worry that the expansion of the electric or self-driving car industry will harm 
carmakers in their states. A handful of these states express their intention to re-
sist the federal program. Undeterred, members of Congress insist that the coop-
eration of all the states is necessary to achieve the goals of the new highway 
system. But the congressional representatives would prefer not to inflame the 
resisting states by issuing direct, and preemptive, federal legislation. May Con-
gress threaten to take away all federal highway funding from these states if they 
do not undertake the necessary improvements—not just new highway funding 
for the new highway system, but all highway money? 
To a degree rarely seen in constitutional law, the answer to this question 
depends on when the question is asked. Prior to June 2012, the answer would 
likely have been yes. The governing Supreme Court precedent, South Dakota v. 
Dole,25 offered a clear answer: “The Constitution empowers Congress to ‘lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.’”26 As part 
of this spending power, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote, Congress “may 
attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds” in order to “further broad pol-
icy objectives.”27 The majority in Dole waved aside concerns about federal co-
ercion of the states that had underpinned analogous cases decades earlier.28 
After June 2012, however, the answer to the question of the scope of Con-
gress’s conditional spending power changed. The Court did not overrule Dole, 
but it dramatically circumscribed the previously vast domain in which the con-
ditional spending power had been understood to operate.29 In NFIB, the Court 
 
 25. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding federal legislation requiring states to raise the 
minimum age for purchase or public possession of alcoholic beverages to twenty-one years 
or else lose a percentage of otherwise available highway funds). 
 26. Id. at 206 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). 
 27. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (plurality opinion)). 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 209-12 (distinguishing prior cases). 
 29. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court 
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It 
to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003) (describing the spending power as “the notable excep-
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invalidated the Medicaid provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on the 
ground that it “penalize[d] States that choose not to participate in that new pro-
gram by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”30 Reviving an early 
twentieth-century strand of doctrine,31 as well as invoking the “new federalist” 
decisions of the 1980s and 1990s, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, “Congress 
may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance 
with federal policies. But when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the legislation 
runs contrary to our system of federalism.”32 In short, the provision amounted 
to “economic dragooning” insofar as it “threatened [the] loss of over 10 percent 
of a State’s overall budget.”33 The Court thus returned an early twentieth-
century notion of coercion to the center of the analysis of federal conditional 
spending programs. 
 But one might reasonably ask whether a Court comprising several 
originalist Justices might be interested in the history of the spending power. 
What was the nature of the power at a time closer to the Founding, perhaps 
nearly two hundred years ago, in 1822? Imagine asking a citizen of the early 
Republic how Congress might permissibly go about building a system of roads 
connecting the Eastern Seaboard with the interior states carved out of the 
Northwest Territory, such as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Would Congress have 
the power to threaten to withhold funding for roads if, for example, Ohio re-
fused to build its roads using a designated sturdy material, such as the new 
Scottish macadam technology, which mixed small stones with cement?34 In 
other words, what textual and structural tools did the federal government pos-
sess in 1822 to compel a state to act? 
 The citizen of 1822 would likely greet these questions with a quizzical ex-
pression. Yes, she would respond, Congress certainly may withhold funding for 
the Ohio road. Then, she would follow with a series of questions: Is the road in 
question located entirely within the State of Ohio? What were the terms of the 
State of Ohio’s admission to the Union? What is the source of the federal road 
funding—a tariff surplus, the general revenues, or some other source? Who 
owns the lands on which the Ohio road is to be built—the federal government, 
the state, or private parties? Has Ohio consented to the construction of the 
road?  
 
tion” to the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival based on “the extremely generous” stand-
ard set forth in Dole). 
 30. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012). 
 31. See Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (noting that 
congressional exercises of the spending power must not cross from “pressure” into “compul-
sion”); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936) (invalidating the processing tax provi-
sion of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as “coercion by economic pressure” and 
therefore an improper use of the taxing power). 
 32. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590). 
 33. Id. at 2605. 
 34. The first macadamized road in the United States was the Boonsboro Turnpike 
Road in Maryland, completed in 1823. Charles J. Farmer, From Baltimore to Cumberland, 
Maryland, in A GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL ROAD 33, 50 (Karl Raitz ed., 1996). 
406 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:397 
These questions from the nineteenth-century observer would aim at under-
standing not just the nature of the condition—the deal that Congress is offering 
the state—but also the mechanism of the federal spending program itself. A 
court in 1822 would likely have concluded that Congress could indeed strip 
road funding from the states35 because it would have questioned whether Con-
gress could constitutionally grant those monies to the state in the first place. To 
early nineteenth-century ears, the Ohio road hypothetical would conjure up an 
entirely different set of constitutional questions from the ones underlying mod-
ern spending power doctrine. The fear of economic dragooning, of comman-
deering the states and rendering them little more than administrative districts, 
lies at the heart of the spending power as it has developed since the early twen-
tieth century. The question of what Congress can compel the states to do ani-
mates much of the Supreme Court’s modern federalism doctrine. Between the 
Revolution and the Civil War, however, American legal and political thought 
considered a different, less defensive question: What can Congress do in the 
name of the states? The modern query asks whether the federal government is 
impermissibly using the states as administrative entities. The interbellum ques-
tion, by contrast, asked whether the federal government was permitted to 
launch public works projects for and within the states. 
The spending power derives from the General Welfare Clause of Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, which provides, “The Congress shall have Power 
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”36 
Although the word “spend” does not appear in the clause, the orthodox under-
standing of the clause is that it vests Congress with the power to tax, and there-
fore to spend, for the general welfare of the United States. The taxing and 
spending powers are thus conceptually and textually linked, but the case law 
under each has diverged over the past several decades. Since the 1930s, taxing 
power cases have typically focused on federal taxation of individuals,37 while 
 
 35. Assuming, of course, that the citizen of 1822 did not regard the offer of federal 
funds as having created a vested right in the state. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 693 (1819) (“As soon as it is in esse, and the franchises 
and property become vested and executed in it, the grant is just as much an executed con-
tract, as if its prior existence had been established for a century.”); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 
(6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when absolute 
rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of the law cannot devest those rights . . . .”); 3 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 268 (Boston, 
Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (discussing the protection of vested property rights from state 
infringement). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 37. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593-601 (upholding the individual mandate provi-
sion of the ACA under the taxing power); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 75 (1936) (in-
validating a tax on agricultural commodities under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
as beyond the scope of the “taxing and spending power”). 
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spending power cases have tended to concern Congress’s authority to use fed-
eral funds to encourage states to adopt particular programs or policies.38 
From the ratification debates of the 1780s to the New Deal controversies of 
the 1930s, the scope and structural relevance of the General Welfare Clause 
were the subjects of extensive controversy. At issue was how the clause fit into 
Article I’s architecture of enumerated powers.39 Was its closest relative the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, which operates as an auxiliary enumerated power 
and thus does not give Congress an independent source of power to enact laws 
based only on the claim that they are necessary and proper?40 This relatively 
narrow view is generally associated with James Madison, who held that the 
general welfare power was not a freestanding power and therefore must be at-
tached to an enumerated power.41 Or was it more akin to one of those enumer-
ated powers, such that Congress could regulate based on a finding that a partic-
ular policy aided the general welfare of the nation? The broadest view of the 
general welfare power as a freestanding power was associated with the Penn-
sylvania Judge Alexander Addison,42 and the prospect that it might become the 
accepted interpretation worried some observers at the ratification debates.43 An 
intermediate position, articulated in the Founding period by Alexander Hamil-
ton44 and advocated in the twentieth century by the political scientist Edward S. 
Corwin, treats the general welfare power as “not an independent grant of pow-
er, but a qualification of the taxing power.”45 On this view, the general welfare 
 
 38. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601-07 (upholding in part and invalidating in part 
the ACA’s expansion of state-run Medicaid programs); Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Da-
vis, 301 U.S. 548, 588-90 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s scheme of encourag-
ing employers to pay taxes to state unemployment compensation funds). 
 39. See LaCroix, supra note 2, at 2082-84 (examining the historical debates concern-
ing the scope of the General Welfare Clause). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Nomenclature is important here: the necessary and 
proper power is an enumerated power, although it has traditionally been treated in the doc-
trine as auxiliary or secondary to the other enumerated powers. See LaCroix, supra note 2, at 
2056-58. 
 41. See Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren (Sept. 20, 1826), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 251, 255 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
 42. See ALEXANDER ADDISON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE 
VIRGINIA ASSEMBLY (1800), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE 
FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, at 1055, 1062-68 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 
1983); see also JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 32-33 (1991). 
 43. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-
1788, at 179-81 (2010). 
 44. See Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a 
Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63, 129 (Harold C. Syrett 
ed., 1965) (“The constitutional test of a right application must always be whether it be for a 
purpose of general or local nature. If the former, there can be no want of constitutional pow-
er. The quality of the object, as how far it will really promote or not the welfare of the union, 
must be matter of conscientious discretion.”).  
 45. See Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress—Apropos the Maternity 
Act, 36 HARV. L. REV. 548, 552 (1923). 
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power is limited to taxing and spending and does not include broader types of 
regulation.  
In United States v. Butler,46 the Court embraced what commentators have 
termed the “Hamiltonian” view of the general welfare power47 before ultimate-
ly rejecting the tax provision in question as impermissibly close to regulation. 
According to the Hamiltonian theory, “the clause confers a power separate and 
distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of 
them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appro-
priate.”48 In other words, when Congress can plausibly characterize a particular 
program as taxing or spending, it need not tie that program to some other enu-
merated power.49  
 Following this ostensibly straightforward lineage, many scholars interested 
in the origins of the spending power have looked to the New Deal period, spe-
cifically the 1936 decision in Butler.50 Others have identified the internal im-
provements debates as the source of the spending power,51 suggesting a more 
or less direct analogy between the early nineteenth-century conception of the 
General Welfare Clause and that of their own period. 
Because it structures the relationship between Congress and the states, the 
spending power is connected to two other important areas of doctrine: on one 
side, congressional power under the Commerce Clause52 and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause;53 and on the other side, the limits that the Tenth Amendment 
places on congressional power. Article I and the Tenth Amendment,54 along 
with the Supremacy Clause,55 constitute the few places in the Constitution’s 
 
 46. 297 U.S. 1, 65-67 (1936). 
 47. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306 (7th ed. 2013) 
(describing the Court in Butler as “[h]aving adopted the Hamiltonian position on the scope 
of the [taxing and] spending power”); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 
1, 3 (1994) (describing Butler as the case “that first explicitly endorsed Hamilton’s view”). 
 48. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66. 
 49. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (adopting a four-part test 
according to which the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the general wel-
fare, the condition must be unambiguous, the condition must have some relation to the feder-
al interest in a particular program, and the condition cannot violate any other constitutional 
provision). 
 50. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 
91 (2001). But see Engdahl, supra note 47, at 35-37 (noting the irony that the Butler holding 
hewed more closely to the Madisonian, rather than the Hamiltonian, version of the power). 
 51. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons 
from the Spending Power, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 495, 513-15 (2009); Corwin, supra note 45, at 
559-65; Engdahl, supra note 47, at 26-31. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 53. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also LaCroix, supra note 2, at 2053-57 (discussing the 
structural similarities between the General Welfare Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause). 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
 55. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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text where we find even implicit reference to federalism.56 The Tenth Amend-
ment is typically viewed as a textual basis for assertions of state sovereignty. 
As such, it becomes doctrinally relevant in two situations. In the first situation, 
Congress issues a general statute aimed at individuals pursuant to one of its 
enumerated powers, and the Court then steps in to strike down the legislation in 
the name of the states and their reserved powers.57 In the second situation, 
Congress attempts to use its enumerated powers to produce a specific action or 
policy from a state legislature or executive, and the Court holds that Congress 
has gone too far—it has “commandeered” the state government.58 The Court’s 
holding in NFIB that the Medicaid provision exceeded constitutional limits and 
amounted to coercion renders the Tenth Amendment a meaningful limit on the 
spending power for the first time in decades.59 The debates over internal im-
provements in the early nineteenth century combined elements of all these doc-
trinal areas in ways that are sometimes surprising to modern observers. 
II. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SPENDING POWER: THE CASE OF 
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 
The debate over the constitutional status of federal internal improvements 
unfolded in several installments between 1817 and 1851. Each episode centered 
on a specific public works project for a road, a canal, a river or harbor, or a rail-
road. Each round of the debate involved different parties, including Presidents 
James Madison, James Monroe, and Andrew Jackson as well as Senators John 
C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Stephen A. Douglas. State legis-
lators, including the young Abraham Lincoln, were also important participants 
in the discussion.  
 At stake in each of these debates was a piece of congressional legislation 
appropriating funds for, or otherwise overseeing, a given improvement project. 
These projects were “internal” in that they affected travel in the interior of the 
nation; sometimes, they were also “internal” to a particular state. In a handful 
 
 56. See LaCroix, supra note 2, at 2045-46. 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Nat’l League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528 (1985). 
 58. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that a con-
gressionally imposed “mandatory obligation” to conduct background checks is unconstitu-
tional); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that “[t]he Federal 
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory pro-
gram”). 
 59. See Metzger, supra note 14, at 84 (describing NFIB as “challeng[ing] th[e] basic 
constitutional consensus” that “the fight over the federal government’s proper role in the 
economic sphere” is “largely political, not constitutional”); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had not invalidat-
ed an act of Congress on the basis of the Spending Clause since 1936). 
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of prominent cases, the President vetoed the bill in question.60 Although some 
commentators have described the process as pitting a series of improvement-
friendly Congresses against a succession of dogged White House opponents,61 
in fact the dynamic was more complex. For example, despite Thomas Jeffer-
son’s advocacy of an agrarian Republic based on decentralized power, his sign-
ing of the Ohio Enabling Act in 1802 and the treaty concluding the Louisiana 
Purchase in 1803 caused contemporaries (as well as later scholars) to view him 
as unmistakably committing federal funds and authority to a national program 
of development.62 Other Presidents, such as John Quincy Adams, as well as 
presidential hopefuls John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay, embraced broad federal 
power to oversee internal improvements.63  
A simple story of a succession of Congresses motivated by a combination 
of partisan and economic interests, arrayed against a series of Constitution-
embracing Presidents, does not match the reality of crosscutting regional, parti-
san, and economic coalitions. Indeed, as suggested by the repeated calls for a 
constitutional amendment permitting internal improvements, many participants 
in the debate agreed that as a practical matter, Congress ought to have the pow-
er to fund such projects.64 Disputes arose because contemporaries both disa-
greed as to whether Congress already in fact possessed such a power and em-
braced widely conflicting views of constitutional text and structure.  
The internal improvements debates unfolded across a series of galvanizing 
moments during the interbellum period. Four of these moments are especially 
helpful in illuminating the multiple constitutional frameworks at work in the 
interbellum period: (1) Madison’s veto of the legislation known as the Bonus 
 
 60. JAMES MONROE, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH HIS 
OBJECTIONS TO THE BILL FOR THE PRESERVATION AND REPAIR OF THE CUMBERLAND ROAD; 
ALSO, A PAPER, CONTAINING HIS VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 
(Washington, D.C., Gales & Seaton 1822); Andrew Jackson, Presidential Veto Message 
(May 27, 1830), in ANNUAL MESSAGES, VETO MESSAGES, PROTEST, &C. OF ANDREW 
JACKSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 27, 27-37 (Baltimore, Edward J. Coale & Co. 2d 
ed. 1835) [hereinafter ANNUAL MESSAGES OF ANDREW JACKSON]; James Madison, Veto 
Message (Mar. 3, 1817), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 584, 584-85 (James D. Richardson ed., Washington, D.C., Gov’t 
Printing Office 1896). 
 61. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 51, at 513-14. 
 62. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE 
YOUNG REPUBLIC 281 (1971); DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS 
8-9 (1984) (“In later years John Quincy Adams correctly paired the Ohio Enabling Act with 
the Louisiana Purchase as destroyers of the original Jeffersonian creed.”); MERRILL D. 
PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND 23-25 (1962); Joseph H. Harrison, 
Jr., Sic et Non: Thomas Jefferson and Internal Improvement, 7 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 335, 340 
(1987). 
 63. See MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND 
CALHOUN 78-83, 414 (1987); SELLERS, supra note 6, at 84. 
 64. See HOWE, supra note 8, at 88 (discussing Jefferson’s and Madison’s support for 
an amendment authorizing internal improvements, for “[o]nly thus could the two presidents 
reconcile their desire for better transportation with a strict construction of the Constitution”); 
Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41, at 254.  
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Bill in 1817; (2) Monroe’s change of opinion on the constitutionality of internal 
improvements between his inauguration in 1817 and his veto of the Cumber-
land Road bill in 1822; (3) Jackson’s rejection of internal improvements, cul-
minating in his veto of the Maysville Road bill in 1830; and (4) congressional 
debates over land grants to states to build railroads, culminating in the passage 
of the Illinois Central Railroad bill in 1850. Each of these moments provides a 
snapshot of the interbellum Constitution as it was being contested and defined 
in the course of political and legal struggle. Taken together, the debates illus-
trate the terrain on which constitutional interpretation was taking place in the 
early nineteenth century. As early nineteenth-century Americans battled over 
the propriety of specific internal improvements programs and distinguished be-
tween permissible and impermissible uses of congressional authority, they 
sharpened their conceptions of Article I enumerated powers and the Tenth 
Amendment. For modern constitutional scholars, these fiery debates demon-
strate the distinctiveness of the early nineteenth-century Constitution. They 
show us familiar text but render it utterly foreign by upending modern pre-
sumptions about what the text meant then, and thus what it might mean now. 
A. The Bonus Bill: Madison’s Presidential Finale (1817) 
On March 3, 1817, James Madison performed his last official act as Presi-
dent by vetoing a bill supported by a group of prominent congressmen, includ-
ing John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay.65 The bill, titled “A Bill to set apart and 
pledge, as a permanent Fund for Internal Improvements, the Bonus of the Na-
tional Bank, and the United States’ Share of its Dividends,”66 proposed to allo-
cate a $1.5 million federal revenue “bonus” and future dividends from the Se-
cond Bank of the United States to a fund “for constructing roads and canals, 
and improving the navigation of watercourses.”67 Federal funding for internal 
improvements projects had been debated at least since 1808, when Treasury 
Secretary Albert Gallatin’s Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Sub-
ject of Public Roads and Canals had made the case for linking the increasingly 
important interior of the United States with the coast.68 The War of 1812, com-
bined with the decline of the Federalist Party, had temporarily halted the drive 
to enact a federal internal improvements policy. But in the aftermath of the war, 
with markets booming and the Second Bank freshly chartered in 1816, nation-
 
 65. See PETERSON, supra note 63, at 79-80. 
 66. H.R. 29, 14th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Feb. 27, 1817). 
 67. Id.; see also Stephen Minicucci, Internal Improvements and the Union, 1790-1860, 
18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 160, 164 (2004) (noting that the contemporary estimate of annual 
dividends from the Bank was $650,000). 
 68. See ALBERT GALLATIN, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ON THE 
SUBJECT OF PUBLIC ROADS AND CANALS; MADE IN PURSUANCE OF A RESOLUTION OF SENATE, 
OF MARCH 2, 1807 (Washington, D.C., R.C. Weightman 1808). See generally GOODRICH, 
GOVERNMENT PROMOTION, supra note 11, at 27-33 (discussing debates surrounding Gal-
latin’s report); LARSON, supra note 11, at 59-63 (same); Goodrich, National Planning, supra 
note 11, at 18-28 (same). 
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alist sentiment swelled, and in February 1817 the Bonus Bill passed in the 
House and Senate, arriving on Madison’s desk four days before his term ended. 
Madison, who had recently prosecuted a war despite substantial sectional 
opposition69 and signed the charter for the new Bank of the United States,70 
astounded the bill’s supporters by announcing his intention to veto it.71 Ignor-
ing Clay’s pointed suggestion that he “leave the bill to [his] successor,”72 Mad-
ison took the veto pen in hand. In so doing, he ensured the bill’s status was un-
ambiguous and final, avoiding the mistake President Adams had made sixteen 
years earlier when issuing last-minute executive commissions.73 The veto was 
unequivocal: Madison asserted that the Constitution did not grant Congress the 
authority to oversee internal improvements.74 
Madison’s veto message offered a forceful refutation of Congress’s plan to 
set apart and pledge certain funds for internal improvements. In returning the 
bill to the House, Madison noted “the insuperable difficulty I feel in reconciling 
the bill with the Constitution of the United States.”75 His argument was 
straightforward: The power to fund internal improvements was not included 
among Congress’s enumerated powers set forth in Article I, Section 8; nor was 
it necessary and proper to the execution of any of those powers.76 Internal im-
provements did not fall within the compass of the Commerce Clause or the 
General Welfare Clause, Madison wrote.77 Moreover, he cautioned against 
viewing the latter clause—to which he referred as “the clause ‘to provide for 
common defense and general welfare’”—as a “general power” rather than a 
“defined and limited” head of authority.78 Properly understood, Madison insist-
 
 69. See Alison L. LaCroix, A Singular and Awkward War: The Transatlantic Context 
of the Hartford Convention, 6 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 3 (2005) (examining New 
England’s opposition to the War of 1812). 
 70. RALPH C.H. CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (1902) 
(noting that in signing the bill authorizing the Second Bank of the United States, Madison 
reversed his previous position opposing its creation); see DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE 
FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 99 (1989). 
 71. See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 609 (1971) (quoting Clay’s 
statement that “no circumstance, not even an earthquake that should have swallowed up half 
this city, could have excited more surprise” than Madison’s decision to veto the bill (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 72. Id. (quoting Letter from Henry Clay to James Madison (Mar. 3, 1817) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
 73. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167-68 (1803). 
 74. See MCCOY, supra note 70, at 97-98 (“For Madison, . . . . Congress was not simp-
ly making a poor or faulty judgment about the constitutionality of a single issue; it was ex-
perimenting with a new approach to establishing constitutionality and perforce threatening to 
transform the character of America’s republican system.”). 
 75. Madison, supra note 60, at 584. 
 76. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 77. See Madison, supra note 60, at 584. 
 78. See id. at 584-85. Some scholars, however, have argued that the language of the 
veto message did allow for the possibility that appropriations for internal improvements 
might be constitutional under the General Welfare Clause. See Carlton Jackson, The Internal 
Improvement Vetoes of Andrew Jackson, 25 TENN. HIST. Q. 261, 265 (1966). On this view, 
February 2015] THE INTERBELLUM CONSTITUTION 413 
ed, the power to provide for the common defense and general welfare extended 
only to “the expenditure of money.” This ability to spend was no mean power, 
he suggested, “money being the ordinary and necessary means” of executing 
“all the great and most important measures of Government.”79 Furthermore, the 
fact that a state might agree to the exercise of federal power in the domain of 
internal improvements, or the suggestion that the act of Congress might itself 
amount to consent, was irrelevant to the analysis. According to Madison, “[t]he 
only cases in which the consent and cession of particular States can extend the 
power of Congress are those specified and provided for in the Constitution.”80 
State consent could thus work to supplement textually specified congressional 
authority. Consent was relevant to determining the scope of Article I power; it 
was not simply a trump that blocked that power. 
This was not to say, however, that Madison believed that a federal internal 
improvements program could never be enacted. On the contrary, Madison sug-
gested that he would readily support such legislation if it were based upon the 
proper textual foundation. The veto message described the President as “cher-
ishing the hope” that the “beneficial objects” of the bill would be accomplished 
through a constitutional amendment explicitly granting Congress the power to 
oversee internal improvements.81 The funding of public works projects in the 
states was not necessarily beyond the scope of congressional power; it simply 
required the people’s genius to express its will that such authority be added to 
the legislative ambit. 
The veto message left obscure the precise nature of the congressional au-
thority at issue in the Bonus Bill. Both before and after Madison issued his ve-
to, however, legislators had dissected and taxonomized the elements of the bill. 
In the House debates prior to the bill’s passage, Calhoun distinguished between 
the power to build roads or canals and the power to appropriate money. Con-
gress did not need the power to “cut” a road or canal in order for the bill to sur-
vive, Calhoun argued; rather, the bill was simply an application of Congress’s 
ordinary power to appropriate money.82 The constitutional issue, therefore, was 
the power to appropriate, not the power to carry out the underlying action for 
which the appropriation was being made. And, Calhoun continued, the power 
to appropriate under the General Welfare Clause could not credibly be limited 
to the enumerated powers absent clear limiting language to that effect. Cannily 
citing the examples of the Louisiana Purchase and the Cumberland Road (both 
 
Madison was distinguishing between congressional power to appropriate versus the power to 
actually construct roads and canals. Madison later maintained that he had intended the 1817 
message to cover appropriations as well as the substantive power to construct internal im-
provements. See Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41; see also 
infra Part II.C. 
 79. Madison, supra note 60, at 585. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 855 (1817). 
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the products of the Jefferson Administration),83 Calhoun sketched the many 
“instances of money appropriated without any reference to the enumerated 
powers.”84 Other supporters of the bill argued that it was covered under the 
commerce power, the power to establish post roads, or the “common defense” 
portion of the general welfare power.85 
Opponents, meanwhile, anticipated Madison’s arguments that the bill was 
an unwarranted extension of federal power into the domain of the states; some 
speakers invoked the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of power to the states.86 
Some critics also distinguished between roads and canals, describing the latter 
as the appropriate object of Congress because they “unite in commercial con-
nexions remote parts of the nation, and chain them together in bands not to be 
severed by ambition or faction,” in contrast to roads, which “are used more by 
the inhabitants of their vicinity than by travellers from a distance.”87 
Attempts to classify the precise nature of the congressional power that was 
at stake recurred throughout the internal improvements debates. Commentators 
typically specified three distinct categories of power: appropriation, execution, 
and ongoing jurisdiction. Appropriation was the most straightforward: the pow-
er to designate federal monies for internal improvement programs. Execution 
implicated Congress more directly in the programs, for it involved passing leg-
islation to authorize not just spending but also the actual construction of roads 
and canals. Ongoing jurisdiction tied federal power most visibly to internal im-
provements because it meant physical presence—for example, federal toll col-
lectors staffing a federally funded and constructed road. If classified as appro-
priation, was the proposed expenditure a proper use of the general welfare 
power? If one believed that Congress needed to point to a more substantive 
enumerated power in order to carry out public works projects, which power (if 
any) best fit the stated purposes of the program—commerce, post roads, com-
mon defense, or something else?88 
Moreover, the related themes of state consent and the possibility of a con-
stitutional amendment continued to sound throughout the period. A proposed 
amendment introduced on the floor of the Senate nine months after the Bonus 
Bill veto was both a speech act by a state (here, Virginia) and a formal textual 
rule that made state authorization necessary for internal improvements pro-
 
 83. See infra text accompanying notes 121-50. 
 84. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 856 (1817). 
 85. See, e.g., id. at 869, 886-89 (statements of Reps. Yates and Sheffey). 
 86. See id. at 895 (statement of Rep. Barbour). 
 87. See id. at 859-60 (statement of Rep. Root). 
 88. The debate surrounding the application of the Postal Clause to internal improve-
ments demonstrates the fine-grained textual analysis in which some commentators engaged. 
After critiquing the argument that the Bonus Bill was justified under the General Welfare 
Clause, one opponent of the bill went on to insist that Congress’s power to “establish post 
offices and post roads” could not be construed as extending to other roads because the ac-
cepted terminology for road construction was “to run or to cut,” not “to establish.” 31 
ANNALS OF CONG. 1271 (1818) (statement of Rep. Sawyer). 
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grams. The draft provision granted Congress the power to appropriate money 
for roads, canals, and watercourses provided “[t]hat no road or canal, shall be 
conducted in any State, nor the navigation of its waters improved, without the 
consent of such State.”89 In the years following Madison’s veto of the Bonus 
Bill, state consent would become a leitmotif of the debates over internal im-
provements. Commentators focused not only on the ongoing need for agree-
ment by the states with respect to specific public works projects but also on the 
original terms under which the post-1787 states had joined the Union.90 
B. Roads I: Bargains with the States (1817-1822) 
On Tuesday, March 4, 1817, the day after Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill, 
James Monroe took office as President. His inaugural address that day suggest-
ed that Clay might have been correct to suspect that the new President would be 
friendlier to internal improvements. But Monroe’s views on the issue changed 
several times over the course of his two terms. In December 1817, Monroe an-
nounced his opposition to internal improvements. Five years later, a road bill 
again stood at the center of public debate, and again it met with the veto. Yet 
again, the President accompanied his veto with a statement explaining his 
views—but in this case, the statement took the form of a sixty-page pamphlet. 
Monroe’s inaugural address contained a paragraph with the potential to 
mollify both supporters and foes of internal improvements. The speech depict-
ed roads and canals as the connective tissue that would “bind the Union more 
closely together.”91 These channels of national feeling would also “facilitat[e] 
the intercourse between the States” and “add much to the convenience and 
comfort of our fellow-citizens, much to the ornament of the country.”92 Yet 
Monroe also used language suggesting that his administration might not reject 
altogether his predecessor’s resistance to a broad congressional power over 
roads and canals. His first reference to internal improvements came with a ca-
veat: among the “interests of high importance” that would “claim attention” 
from the new chief magistrate would be “the improvement of our country by 
roads and canals, proceeding always with a constitutional sanction.”93 Did the 
new President believe that the Constitution as currently written contained such 
a sanction, such that this was a descriptive statement, or was he cautioning his 
listeners to distinguish carefully between permissible and impermissible uses of 
congressional power? Monroe’s statement left room for different interpreta-
 
 89. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 21-22 (1817). 
 90. See Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Condi-
tions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 121 (2004) (charac-
terizing admission conditions as “a Congressional tool in imposing homogeneity and ex-
panding the scope of federal power”). 
 91. James Monroe, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1817), in 2 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 60, at 4, 8. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (emphasis added). 
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tions. Clearly, though, Monroe shared Madison’s view that the internal im-
provements question was not only a political disagreement but also a debate 
about the meaning of the Constitution. 
Nine months later, in December 1817, Monroe launched an unambiguous 
salvo against internal improvements. His first annual message to Congress an-
nounced his “settled conviction” that Congress “do[es] not possess the right” to 
“establish such a system of improvement.”94 Monroe acknowledged that this 
position represented a shift from the views he had previously articulated, de-
scribing himself as “[d]isregarding early impressions.”95 His objection 
stemmed from what he now regarded as a lack of the constitutional sanction he 
had invoked in his inaugural address. The power to establish internal improve-
ments, Monroe maintained, was “not contained in any of the specified powers 
granted to Congress,” nor could it be viewed as “incidental to or a necessary 
means, viewed on the most liberal scale, for carrying into effect any of the 
powers which are specifically granted.”96 The ability to promote internal im-
provements simply was not contained in Congress’s array of Article I powers.  
Importantly, however, Monroe echoed Madison’s suggestion that the tex-
tual landscape needed alteration. Monroe urged Congress to recognize the 
“propriety of recommending to the States the adoption of an amendment to the 
Constitution which shall give to Congress the right in question.”97 Monroe thus 
assured his audience that he, too, believed in the utility of federal internal im-
provements. Such a power in Congress would be useful as a practical matter, 
but a specific textual authorization was needed to add the power to the federal 
legislative arsenal. Monroe appeared sanguine about such an amendment’s 
chances of success. Again, like Madison, he suggested that the political entity 
of the people, whom he referred to as “our constituents,” stood ready to delib-
erate about potential changes to the constitutional text: “We may confidently 
rely that if it appears to their satisfaction that the power is necessary, it will al-
ways be granted.”98 The people were no longer “out of doors”; on the contrary, 
they were somewhere nearby, ready to be gaveled into action and to oblige 
their representatives with a burst of higher lawmaking.99 “In cases of doubtful 
construction,” Monroe maintained, “it comports with the nature and origin of 
our institutions, and will contribute much to preserve them, to apply to our con-
 
 94. James Monroe, First Annual Message (Dec. 12, 1817), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 60, at 11, 18. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. On the eighteenth-century conception of popular sovereignty and the related idea 
of the people “out-of-doors,” see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 141-42 (enlarged ed. 1992); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 45-47 (2004); and 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 319-28 (1969). 
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stituents for an explicit grant of the power.”100 Triggering a constitutional 
amendment appeared entirely feasible to interbellum commentators, in contrast 
to the modern view of the Article V process as effectively impossible except in 
rare circumstances.101 For some early nineteenth-century commentators, the 
text of the Constitution virtually invited the people to revise their foundational 
law on occasion—or, in any event, when invited to do so by their representa-
tives.102 
Monroe’s newly stringent views galvanized Clay and other congressional 
supporters of internal improvements into action. In addition to continuing to 
draft amendments granting Congress the relevant new enumerated power,103 
advocates of internal improvements in the House convened a select committee 
to respond to Monroe’s annual message. Two days after being convened by 
Speaker Clay, the committee, chaired by Henry St. George Tucker, son of the 
venerable Virginia judge and treatise writer, produced a report that forcefully 
rebutted Monroe’s claims. The Tucker Committee’s report emphasized two 
themes: first, the consent of the states; and second, the distinction between the 
power to appropriate funds for internal improvements, the power to construct 
roads and canals, and the power to maintain ongoing jurisdiction in those im-
provements.104 
As a matter of text and precedent, the report argued, if a given state con-
sented to a specific federal internal improvements program, that program was a 
constitutional exercise of one of the primary enumerated powers (post offices 
and post roads, common defense, or commerce), or else necessary and proper 
to the execution of those powers.105 The report thus offered a cooperative vi-
sion of internal improvements federalism.106 A road, the argument went, was 
the product of combining a state’s territorial sovereignty with federal funds 
and, even more important, with the impetus to connect across federal space. 
Therefore, the report argued that although “the Constitution confers only a right 
 
100. Monroe, supra note 94, at 18. 
101. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2001) (“[T]hrough most of our history, the amendment process 
has not been an important means of constitutional change.”). 
102. See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From Sov-
ereignty to Jurisdiction in the Early Republic, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 375-77 (describing 
proposals to amend Article III in the post-Founding period); cf. MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL 
FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
6, 15 (2001) (describing early nineteenth-century Americans as reluctant to change the con-
stitutional text). 
103. See, e.g., 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 21-22 (1817) (proposing an amendment explicitly 
granting federal power for internal improvements with state consent and distributional limi-
tations). 
104. Id. at 452-53 (report by Rep. Tucker). 
105. See id. at 455-56. 
106. See id. at 456 (“It is not proposed to enter upon the delicate inquiry whether this 
right can be exercised by the General Government without the assent of the respective States 
through whose territories a road is constructed in time of peace, with a view to military oper-
ations in any future wars.”). 
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of way, and . . . the rights of soil and jurisdiction remain exclusively with the 
States respectively, . . . there seems no sound objection to the improvement of 
roads with their assent.”107  
Significantly, the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states 
and the people appeared to the committee to present no bar to this focus on 
state consent. On the contrary, the report pointed to the Tenth Amendment as 
the source of a state’s right to consent: “For if, by the 10th amendment, this 
right is reserved to the States, it is within the power of the State to grant it, un-
less the United States are incapable of receiving such a privilege.”108 The 
members of the Tucker Committee thus viewed the Tenth Amendment not as a 
defensive bulwark to be invoked against invasions of state sovereignty but ra-
ther as a fount of the state’s own legal powers, including the power to consent 
(or not) to the introduction of a federal right-of-way. The state’s ability to grant 
or withhold its consent to a particular improvement project therefore obviated 
the need for a general constitutional amendment.109 On this view, federalism 
could be preserved by placing the burden on individual states to opt out of con-
gressional regulation, rather than by requiring Congress to point to a particular 
enumerated power (and to launch a popular movement to add one to the text if 
none existed). In an inversion of much of the Court’s modern federalism juris-
prudence,110 a robust ability in the states themselves to safeguard their own 
power under the Tenth Amendment was believed to better protect the states 
than the alternative of judicial limits on congressional power. 
To be sure, the consent-based view articulated in the Tucker Committee’s 
report was contested during the period. In a letter to Tucker shortly after the re-
port was published, Madison challenged the report’s consent-based theory.111 
Madison wrote that he could not “concur in the latitude of Construction taken 
in the Report, or in the principle that the Consent of States, even of a single 
one, can enlarge the jurisdiction of the Gen[era]l Gov[ernmen]t.”112 Conse-
quently, he did not share the Tucker Committee’s call for the Bonus Bill to be 
revived absent a constitutional amendment.113 
In addition to its emphasis on state consent, the Tucker Committee’s report 
also differentiated among various slices of congressional power over internal 
 
107. Id. at 455 (emphases added). 
108. Id. 
109. See LARSON, supra note 11, at 112. 
110. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“State officials 
thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated 
in the Constitution.”). 
111. See Letter from James Madison to Henry St. George Tucker (Dec. 23, 1817), in 8 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (1908), supra note 41, at 402, 402-03; see also MCCOY, 
supra note 70, at 96-97 (describing Madison’s disapproval of “Tucker’s opportunistic con-
founding of utility and constitutionality”). 
112. See Letter from James Madison to Henry St. George Tucker, supra note 111, at 
403. 
113. See 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 460 (1817) (concluding with a proposal to use incorpora-
tion fees and dividends from the Second Bank as a “fund for internal improvement”). 
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improvements, especially the powers of appropriation, execution, and jurisdic-
tion. The report culminated with its strongest claim: that Congress possessed 
the authority to execute federal internal improvements programs directly. In 
other words, Congress could itself “construct roads and canals through the sev-
eral States” (again, with consent).114 This power did not extend to “jurisdic-
tional rights,” which remained with the states.115 Jurisdictional rights were un-
derstood to refer to ongoing operation of the road or canal in question—for 
example, maintaining tollgates.116 As for the appropriations power, the report 
rejected Monroe’s view that the exercise of such a power amounted to an un-
constitutional attempt by Congress to “establish” internal improvements. Un-
like an attempt to assert jurisdiction over the road or canal, and thereby to “fed-
eralize” it, an appropriation was a limited federal intervention at the beginning 
of a project. The theory was that Congress would appropriate funds, but the 
construction would be carried out by the state.117 The Tucker Committee’s re-
port pointed to the expansive nature of the “common defense and general wel-
fare” provision of Article I, Section 8 to bolster its claim for a congressional 
power of appropriation as an absolute constitutional minimum.118  
The House’s response to the Tucker Committee’s report accepted the 
committee’s spectrum of congressional powers but stopped short of echoing its 
full-throated endorsement of expansive federal authority. The full chamber 
passed a nonbinding resolution granting Congress the power to appropriate 
money for the construction of “post roads, military, and other roads, and of ca-
nals,” but the committee’s three other resolutions providing for actual federal 
construction failed.119 For many contemporaries, then, the broad contours of 
the General Welfare Clause provided a sound textual basis for federal funding 
to the states, which would in turn use the money to build roads and canals. But 
the other enumerated powers were regarded by many interbellum Americans as 
insufficient to give Congress the authority to build the roads and canals itself.  
Monroe’s second term brought renewed public attention to these questions, 
with a different focus. In the wake of the Tucker Committee’s report, Secretary 




116. See infra text accompanying notes 128-50 (discussing Monroe’s Cumberland Road 
veto message, in which he cautioned that “[a] power to establish turnpikes with gates and 
tolls, and to enforce the collection of the tolls by penalties, implies a power to adopt and ex-
ecute a complete system of internal improvement” (quoting MONROE, supra note 60, at 3) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
117. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 458 (1817) (“If, indeed, the power was denied to the General 
Government of constructing roads and canals themselves, a question might still arise, wheth-
er it had not power to appropriate part of the revenue ‘to aid in the construction of roads and 
canals by the States.’”). 
118. Id. 
119. 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1381, 1385-88 (1818). 
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of roads and canals for military as well as commercial purposes.120 But the 
next major event in the internal improvements drama was Monroe’s veto of the 
Cumberland Road bill in 1822. 
The origins of the Cumberland Road lay in the negotiations surrounding 
Ohio’s organization as a state beginning in 1802 and its admission to the Union 
in 1803. Pursuant to its admission compact, Ohio was guaranteed that Congress 
would set aside five percent of all future net proceeds from the sale of lands in 
the state to build roads.121 Three percent of the proceeds were to be spent on 
roads within Ohio, and two percent were to be spent on roads between Ohio 
and the eastern states.122 The roads connecting the state with the Eastern Sea-
board were of particular concern to Ohioans, who wanted to ensure access to 
coastal cities and markets. The Cumberland Road (sometimes known as the Na-
tional Road)123 was built as part of this program, extending from Cumberland, 
Maryland, on the Potomac River, west through Ohio, eventually ending at 
Vandalia, Illinois. The road received congressional approval in 1806, and con-
struction began in 1811.124 
 For the first eleven years of its existence, the Cumberland Road was rela-
tively uncontroversial, despite the ongoing disputes about the status of internal 
improvements. The road’s origins in Ohio’s admission compact led contempo-
raries to view it as a product of contract, rather than constitutional, law.125 
Consequently, the road routinely received appropriations, even during periods 
when Congress or the President was otherwise resistant to funding roads and 
canals.126 
All this changed in 1822, however, when Congress passed a bill to repair 
the Cumberland Road. Crucially, the bill also provided for the installation of 
“toll houses, gates, and turnpikes” on the road.127 This provision proved to be 
 
120. J.C. Calhoun, Report on Roads and Canals, Communicated to the House of Repre-
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the bill’s undoing. The following day, Monroe vetoed the bill. The President 
accompanied his veto with a lengthy pamphlet titled Views of the President of 
the United States, on the Subject of Internal Improvements.128 
Monroe argued that the Cumberland Road bill was a dramatic and unwar-
ranted expansion of congressional power over internal improvements. As in his 
first annual message of 1817, he insisted that if such a power was to be exer-
cised, it must be grounded in a constitutional amendment. While Monroe 
agreed with the contemporary consensus that the initial construction of the road 
was unproblematic insofar as it stemmed from Ohio’s admission compact,129 
he argued that the new bill was an unprecedented expansion of congressional 
power. In practice, the “preservation and repair” of the road130 meant that fed-
eral officials would be stationed along a road traversing the interior of the na-
tion, with a perpetual brief to demand money from travelers and merchants. “A 
power to establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection 
of the tolls by penalties, implies a power to adopt and execute a complete sys-
tem of internal improvement,” Monroe warned.131 The veto message conjured 
the specter of presidentially appointed toll collectors as the vanguard of “a 
complete right of jurisdiction and sovereignty, for all the purposes of internal 
improvement.”132 The fact that the officials would be appointed by the Presi-
dent, rather than by Congress,133 did not appear to assuage Monroe’s fears; ra-
 
For every space of twenty miles in length of the said road, the following sums of money, and 
so in proportion for any greater or lesser distance, to wit: For every score of sheep or hogs, 
six and a quarter cents; for every score of cattle, twelve and a half cents; for every led or 
drove horse, one cent; for every horse and rider, six and a quarter cents; for every sleigh or 
sled, for each horse or ox drawing the same, three cents; for every dearborn, sulkey, chair, or 
chaise, with one horse, twelve and a half cents; for every chariot, coach, coachee, stage wag-
on, phaeton, chaise, or dearborn, with two horses and four wheels, eighteen and three-quarter 
cents; for either of the carriages last mentioned, with four horses, twenty-five cents. For eve-
ry other carriage of pleasure, under whatever name it may go, the like sum, according to the 
number of wheels and horses drawing the same. For every cart or wagon, whose wheels do 
not exceed the breadth of four inches, six and one fourth cents for each horse or ox drawing 
the same. For every cart or wagon, whose wheels shall exceed in breadth four inches, and not 
exceeding six inches, three cents for every horse or ox drawing the same; and every other 
cart or wagon, whose wheels shall exceed six inches, shall pass the said gates free and clear 
of toll.  
Id. at 1872-73. Exceptions from tolls were specified for “any person passing to or from pub-
lic worship, or to or from his common business on his farm or woodland, or to or from a fu-
neral, or to or from a mill.” Id. at 1873. 
128. James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States, on the Subject of In-
ternal Improvements (1822), in MONROE, supra note 60, at 7. 
129. See id. at 42 (stating in his veto message that the Cumberland Road “was founded 
on an article of compact between the United States and the state of Ohio”). 
130. Id. at 3. 
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133. See 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1872 (1822) (“And be it further enacted, That, as soon as 
the said gates and turnpikes shall be erected, the President of the United States is hereby au-
thorized to appoint, or cause to be appointed, toll-gatherers, to demand and receive, for pass-
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ther, the bill’s entire toll-gathering structure amounted to an unconstitutional 
congressional overreach. 
Yet Monroe’s attack on the bill also contained a modulation of his earlier 
views. In contrast to his suggestion in the 1817 annual message that Congress 
might lack the power even to appropriate funds for internal improvements,134 
the 1822 veto message distinguished between the ongoing “right of jurisdiction 
and sovereignty” and the power to make occasional appropriations.135 Appro-
priations might be justified if the state in question consented, but Monroe con-
tended that the states lacked the power to consent to federal jurisdiction and 
sovereignty.136 The fact that the entire Ohio congressional delegation had voted 
for the bill seemed not to matter to Monroe’s evaluation of whether the state 
had consented to the appropriations.137 Similarly, in Views of the President of 
the United States, on the Subject of Internal Improvements, Monroe reaffirmed 
his opposition to the Tucker Committee’s expansive view of state consent. But 
he also diverged from the narrow theory of appropriations that Madison had ar-
ticulated in his veto of the Bonus Bill. Whereas Madison had insisted on a nar-
row reading of the spending power under the General Welfare Clause, Monroe 
now read the Constitution to grant Congress “the right to appropriate” but not 
“the right to make internal improvements.”138 Consistent with this analysis, 
Monroe proposed that Congress revise the bill to provide appropriations for re-
pairs to the road but omit the tollgate plan.139 At the boundary between appro-
priations and jurisdiction, then, Monroe viewed the Tenth Amendment as shift-
ing from a declaration of states’ rights to a restraint on the states’ power to give 
up those rights.  
With his Views of the President of the United States, on the Subject of In-
ternal Improvements, Monroe moved beyond his constitutional obligation to 
communicate objections after presentment,140 taking his views to the coordi-
nate branches of government and indeed to a broader public stage. The Presi-
dent went so far as to send copies of the veto message and the pamphlet to the 
members of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice John Marshall replied with a 
brief and hedging letter of acknowledgment. After noting that he had read the 
materials “with great attention and interest,” Marshall concluded with a vague 
 
134. See Monroe, supra note 94, at 18; see also supra text accompanying notes 94-96. 
135. See FELLER, supra note 62, at 57 (“Monroe’s new constitutional interpretation left 
Congress free to subsidize state and private projects and to continue the Cumberland Road, 
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1874-75 (1822). 
138. Monroe, supra note 128, at 46. 
139. See id. at 3; see also FELLER, supra note 62, at 57. 
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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set of observations on internal improvements.141 The Chief Justice termed the 
President’s views “profound” and “most generally just.”142 He then made the 
following observation: 
A general power over internal improvement, if to be exercised by the Union, 
would certainly be cumbersome to the government, & of no utility to the peo-
ple. But, to the extent you recommend, it would be productive of no mischief, 
and of great good. I despair however of the adoption of such a measure.143  
Marshall appeared to agree with Monroe’s distinction between appropriations 
for road and canal construction on one hand (permissible) and ongoing federal 
management of tolls and traffic on the other hand (impermissible). But these 
views are surprising from the Chief Justice who, two years later, would read the 
Commerce and Supremacy Clauses to find that a federal coasting statute 
preempted a state steamboat monopoly in Gibbons v. Ogden.144  
In contrast to Marshall’s temporizing, the outspoken Justice William John-
son responded to Monroe’s mailing with an overtly nationalist view of internal 
improvements more in line with what one might have expected from Marshall. 
Stating that his “Brother Judges” had “instructed” him in his reply,145 Johnson 
maintained that the Court’s decision two years earlier in McCulloch v. Mary-
land146 should also be viewed as the Justices’ opinion on the constitutionality 
of internal improvements. The Court’s decision to uphold Congress’s estab-
lishment of the Second Bank and deny Maryland’s power to tax the Bank, 
Johnson argued, “completely commits them on the subject of internal im-
provement, as applied to Postroads and Military Roads.”147  
Monroe’s veto of the Cumberland Road bill capped five years of intense 
efforts by two Presidents and numerous members of Congress to articulate a 
theory of internal improvements. Throughout the debates, there was broad 
agreement that roads and canals were desirable and even necessary to carry 
passengers, produce, news, and goods throughout the expanding nation.148 
Even in Madison’s and Monroe’s strongest veto messages, each of them took 
pains to note that the projects themselves would likely bring substantial bene-
fits. “I am not unaware of the great importance of roads and canals and the im-
proved navigation of water courses,” Madison wrote, “and that a power in the 
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National Legislature to provide for them might be exercised with signal ad-
vantage to the general prosperity.”149  
But both Presidents insisted that any general congressional power to devel-
op substantive internal improvements plans must be grounded in a constitution-
al amendment; it simply did not exist in their view of the text. Madison and 
Monroe therefore urged Congress to continue the Founders’ drafting process by 
using the amendment process to add another enumerated power to the list found 
in Article I.150 The prospect of appropriations alone, meanwhile, raised textual 
and structural questions about how the General Welfare Clause fit into the list 
of congressional powers and into the system of federalism more broadly. This 
wide-ranging interrogation of different levels of constitutional proposals to deal 
with the internal improvements question continued for decades after Monroe’s 
veto of the Cumberland Road bill. 
C. Roads II: Money Versus Land (1826-1830) 
The internal improvements debate entered a new phase with Andrew Jack-
son’s election to the presidency in 1828. In 1828, as in the bitter 1824 contest 
that Jackson ultimately lost to John Quincy Adams, the internal improvements 
question was intertwined with other highly controversial issues, including the 
tariff, the retirement of the national debt and the resulting prospect of a federal 
budget surplus, and the expansion of slavery.151 Consequently, Jackson viewed 
internal improvements as a site to demonstrate his commitment to local markets 
and his belief that the powers of the national government (or, at any rate, Con-
gress) ought to be limited. Jackson ultimately vetoed six internal improvement 
bills, four of them through the pocket veto.152 It was the Maysville Road veto, 
however, that reignited the internal improvements blaze and sent Jackson and 
his lieutenant Martin Van Buren scrambling to find support for their positions 
in text and precedent. 
The Maysville Road was connected both spatially and conceptually to the 
vexed Cumberland Road. The bill authorized the federal government to pur-
chase $150,000 worth of stock in a Kentucky corporation, the Maysville, 
Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company, which would in 
turn build an intra-Kentucky portion of a larger road connecting the Cumber-
 
149. Madison, supra note 60, at 585; see also SELLERS, supra note 6, at 150-51 (hy-
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RIGHTS, AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS 13-14 (1987); SCHLESINGER, supra note 5, at 57-58; 
WILENTZ, supra note 7, at 301-02. 
152. Jackson, supra note 78, at 278. Carlton Jackson notes, however, that President 
Jackson approved more internal improvements bills than he vetoed. Id. at 261. 
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land Road at Zanesville, Ohio, with the Tennessee River at Florence, Ala-
bama.153 Unlike the Cumberland Road bill that Monroe had rejected, the 
Maysville Road bill contemplated an appropriation rather than ongoing federal 
control.154 Shares, not tollgates, were at stake in 1830. 
The bill was vigorously debated in the House for three days and ultimately 
passed by a vote of 102 to 86.155 But Jackson’s nephew and secretary, Andrew 
Jackson Donelson, subsequently returned the bill to the House with the news 
that the President had declined to sign it. After the obligatory claim of support 
for internal improvements in general,156 Jackson’s veto message cited two 
principal problems with the bill: first, its assertion of what Jackson regarded as 
an unconstitutional extension of the appropriations power; and second, its at-
tempt to extend federal power into what Jackson viewed as the inherently local 
domain of the states.157 
For the appropriations point, Jackson focused on Madison’s veto of the 
Bonus Bill and Monroe’s veto of the Cumberland Road bill. Despite decades of 
practice dating back to the Louisiana Purchase that had expanded the appro-
priations power, Jackson suggested that a proper understanding of the text ar-
gued against such an interpretation. Although he noted the necessity of ceding 
to “a well settled acquiescence of the people and confederated authorities, in 
particular constructions of the constitution, on doubtful points,” Jackson argued 
that the expansive tendencies of the appropriations power required strict inter-
pretation.158 Congress and past Presidents had claimed a broad appropriations 
power, according to which “the right of appropriation is not limited by the 
power to carry into effect the measure for which the money is asked.”159 But 
Jackson emphasized that Monroe’s adoption of the broad view represented a 
change from Monroe’s own previously stated belief that Congress could appro-
priate money from general funds only to carry out its enumerated powers, and 
not in the service of a broader notion of the general welfare.160 Indeed, Jackson 
hinted that a broad appropriations power should be understood as a deviation 
from the constitutional text and from the Founders’ views. The recent expan-
sion of the appropriations power demonstrated “the difficulty, if not impracti-
cability, of bringing back the operations of the government to the construction 
of the constitution set up in 1793, assuming that to be its true reading, in rela-
 
153. See H.R. 285, 21st Cong. (1830); see also Jackson, supra note 78, at 262. 
154. See GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION, supra note 11, at 41-42 (describing the 
financial structure of the Maysville Road bill). 
155. See 6 REG. DEB. 820-22, 827-42 (1830). 
156. See Jackson, supra note 60, at 27 (“Sincerely friendly to the improvement of our 
country by means of roads and canals, I regret that any difference of opinion in the mode of 
contributing to it should exist between us . . . .”). 
157. See id. at 29, 31. 
158. Id. at 31. 
159. Id. at 30. 
160. Id. 
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tion to the power” of appropriations, Jackson observed.161 The history of the 
appropriations power thus proved “the necessity of guarding the constitution 
with sleepless vigilance, against the authority of precedents which have not the 
sanction of its most plainly defined powers.”162 Jackson’s veto message thus 
suggested that he supported a narrow construction of Congress’s power under 
the General Welfare Clause. On this view, Congress could therefore appropri-
ate money from general federal funds only to carry out its primary enumerated 
powers, and not in the service of a broader notion of the general welfare. The 
Madisonian conception of the General Welfare Clause, in other words, was still 
alive. 
 Of course, one consequence of this distinction between the spending power 
and the other enumerated powers was to permit supporters of internal im-
provements to use the appropriations power as a wedge to create an opening for 
Congress to act. On this point, Jackson cited Madison, pointing to the Bonus 
Bill veto as evidence of the need to distinguish between the appropriations 
power and the power to execute improvements projects.163 But in correspond-
ence with Van Buren, the seventy-nine-year-old Madison protested that this 
claim mischaracterized his 1817 veto. On the contrary, Madison insisted, 
It was an object of the Veto to deny to Congress as well the appropriating 
power, as the executing and jurisdictional branches of it. And it is believed 
that this was the general understanding at the time, and has continued to be so, 
according to the references occasionally made to the document. Whether the 
language employed duly conveyed the meaning of which J. M. retains the 
consciousness, is a question on which he does not presume to judge for oth-
ers.164  
According to Madison, then, his 1817 veto had opposed the appropriations 
power as well as the power to carry out internal improvements.165  
Jackson, however, did not press the claim in his veto quite so far. Perhaps 
because he sought to preserve the appropriations power as applied to other 
types of improvements, such as lighthouses and military fortifications,166 he 
presented himself as willing to tolerate the acquiesced-in view of the appropria-
 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 30-31, 34 (“[The country] cannot be benefitted by a legislation which toler-
ates a scramble for appropriations that have no relation to any general system of improve-
ment, and whose good effects must, of necessity, be very limited. In the best view of these 
appropriations, the abuses to which they lead, far exceed the good which they are capable of 
promoting.”). 
163. Id. at 28-30 (distinguishing between Congress’s power to assert ongoing jurisdic-
tion over internal improvements, which affects the sovereignty of the states, and its power to 
appropriate money, which is then spent on projects carried out by the states). 
164. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren (June 3, 1830), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (1910), supra note 41, at 375, 376. 
165. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Constitution of the Second Generation, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1775 (analyzing the Madison-Van Buren exchange as an example of intertemporal con-
stitutional interpretation).  
166. See Jackson, supra note 78, at 265.  
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tions power that he believed had emerged in practice since the 1790s.167 Rather 
than launching a frontal attack on practice, Jackson introduced a different limit-
ing factor into the analysis. Appropriations for internal improvements were 
constitutional only to the extent that they adhered to what Jackson termed a 
“general principle”: “that the works which might be thus aided, should be ‘of a 
general, not local—national, not state’ character.”168 The Maysville Road bill 
failed this test. Collapsing the boundary between general and local, national 
and state, Jackson argued, “would of necessity lead to the subversion of the 
federal system.”169 The Maysville Road simply did not meet the requirement of 
national character, he wrote, because it had “no connexion with any established 
system of improvements” and was “exclusively within the limits of a state, 
starting at a point on the Ohio river, and running out sixty miles to an interior 
town.”170 The local-national distinction crystallized much of the past several 
decades’ debates about internal improvements. The Maysville Road veto was 
widely popular, in part because the distinction appeared to capture some essen-
tial truth about the federal system.171 “The veto message was a hodgepodge of 
constitutional and expedient arguments,” noted Daniel Feller, “but in its very 
logical fuzziness lay its political strength.”172 
Indeed, the local-national approach to internal improvements questions had 
emerged a few years before it achieved prominence through the Maysville 
Road veto. Prior to the Maysville controversy—indeed, prior to Jackson’s elec-
tion—Madison and then-Senator Van Buren exchanged a series of letters on the 
 
167. Jackson’s reliance on acquiescence and practice anticipated Justice Felix Frankfur-
ter’s concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (rejecting an 
“inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law” that would look to “the 
words of the Constitution” and ignore “the gloss which life has written upon them”); see also 
Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75 (2013), http://cdn 
.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol126_lacroix.pdf (responding to Curtis 
A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012)). 
168. Jackson, supra note 60, at 31. 
169. Id. The underlying concept behind this distinction dated from the colonial period, 
when British North Americans argued that imperial regulations that encroached on the colo-
nies’ internal affairs violated what they regarded as the constitution of the British Empire. 
See, e.g., RICHARD BLAND, THE COLONEL DISMOUNTED: OR THE RECTOR VINDICATED 22-23 
(Williamsburg, Virginia, Joseph Royle 1764) (arguing that for purposes of external govern-
ment, “we are, and must be, subject to the Authority of the British Parliament,” but that “the 
Legislature of the Colony have a Right to enact ANY Law they shall think necessary for 
their INTERNAL Government”); see also LACROIX, supra note 13, at 42-44 (discussing the 
internal-external distinction in eighteenth-century American thought). 
170. Jackson, supra note 60, at 31. 
171. See HOWE, supra note 8, at 359 (terming the Maysville veto and message 
“[p]olitically . . . a masterstroke” because it was “crafted to endorse what we would call the 
transportation revolution while condemning what we would call big government”). 
172. See FELLER, supra note 62, at 139. Feller continued, “The nebulous distinction be-
tween national and local works stung American System men to fury, for it freed Jackson to 
decide on individual bills precisely as he chose—a freedom he exploited to the utmost.” Id. 
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subject of internal improvements.173 Van Buren initiated the correspondence 
by requesting Madison’s views on a constitutional amendment that Van Buren 
had proposed. “There is not in my opinion any other matter so threatening to 
the confederacy as the pretension of the Federal Government upon this sub-
ject,” the Senator from New York wrote to the retired President.174 
At this moment, the assumed power is used by the Government as a most 
powerful, indeed irresistable [sic] engine, to acquire the favour & secure the 
allegiance of portions of the union at the expense of those who having made 
the constitution know what it cost & what it is worth. It is supposed that an ex-
tension of the money power beyond that of Jurisdiction is practicable and in-
dispensable to the successful operation of the Government.175 
Van Buren concluded with a bold petition not only for Madison’s views but al-
so for a draft revision to the Constitution’s text: “If agreeable it would please 
me to have an amendment worded by yourself; but it does not become me to be 
more particular.” Van Buren then promptly closed by tendering his regards to 
Mrs. Madison.176  
In his correspondence with Madison, Van Buren thus emphasized the ap-
propriations-jurisdiction distinction. Madison replied with a letter in which he 
outlined a range of possible structural mechanisms to address what he regarded 
as the constitutional problem of internal improvements. Madison sketched four 
options: (1) a functional division of power between the general government and 
the states; (2) a constitutional amendment granting Congress the power to ap-
propriate for internal improvements; (3) a constitutional amendment granting 
Congress a general power over internal improvements; or (4) a more profound 
constitutional amendment revising the language of the General Welfare Clause. 
Madison began by evaluating a functional separation between federal and 
state authority: “dividing the power between the General & State 
Gov[ernmen]ts, by allotting the appropriating branch to the former, & reserving 
the jurisdiction to the latter.”177 According to this subject-matter-based division 
of legislative power, Congress would have the power to appropriate funds for 
internal improvements, but execution of the programs and jurisdiction over the 
finished projects would be the state’s domain.178  
 
173. In his autobiography, written in the 1850s, Van Buren claimed that he had both 
advised Jackson to veto the Maysville Road bill and drafted the veto message. See LARSON, 
supra note 11, at 183. 
174. Letter from M.V. Buren to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1826), available at http:// 
memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/h?ammem/mjm:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28mjm019810 
%29%29. For an early access transcription of the letter, see Martin Van Buren to James 
Madison, 30 Aug. 1826, FOUNDERS EARLY ACCESS, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu 
/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print-02-02-02-0725 (last visited Jan. 28, 2015). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41, at 253. 
178. On the efforts of Founding-era theorists to construct a subject-matter-based divi-
sion of power between levels of government within the Federal Republic, see LACROIX, su-
pra note 13, at 7-9, 103-04. 
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While this tidy line-drawing had “doubtless a captivating aspect,” Madison 
rejected the solution based on “the difficult[y] of defining such a division, and 
maintaining it in practice.”179 As previous decades’ debates had shown, the line 
between appropriations and jurisdiction was a fuzzy one. Was the construction 
of tollgates on the Cumberland Road an exercise of the spending power, or was 
it an attempt to exert ongoing federal control over traffic and commerce on the 
road? Moreover, Madison was skeptical that the people of the United States 
would be willing to fund projects and then give up the ability to monitor and 
control those projects to “ensure their constant subservience to national purpos-
es.”180 Given the lack of clear boundaries, Congress would eventually expand 
its domain to include jurisdiction, but with no textual or structural basis to rein 
in such reaching. 
Rather than settling for a murky division between types of power, Madison 
advocated a step that would “obviate the unconstitutional precedent” of past 
decades while also recognizing the growth in the “constructive authority of 
Congress” over that period.181 Madison thus proposed two types of constitu-
tional amendments. One would give Congress a new enumerated power over 
internal improvements, but only for appropriations. Such an amendment would 
read, “Congress may make appropriations of moneys for roads and canals, to be 
applied to such purposes by the Legislatures of the States within their respec-
tive limits, the jurisdiction of the States remaining unimpaired.”182 Congress 
would thus give funds to state legislatures to be used for roads and canals, and 
the state legislatures would carry out the projects. But what would happen if a 
state refused? Madison did not discuss this possibility in the letter to Van Bu-
ren. An earlier draft amendment introduced in the Senate in 1817 had granted 
Congress the power to appropriate money for internal improvements, provided 
that the state in question consented to the project.183 The inclusion of a consent 
provision implied that a state could refuse road or canal funding. Madison’s 
language, however, contained no such provision, leaving open the question of 
whether a state could decline the federal money. 
In his second suggested amendment, Madison proposed granting to Con-
gress the entire bundle of powers relating to internal improvements. His draft 
amendment stated, “Congress may make roads & canals, with such jurisdiction 
as the cases may require.”184 Unlike the appropriations amendment, this provi-
sion contemplated an appropriation by Congress, followed by federal—not 
 
179. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41, at 253. 
180. Id. Indeed, as the facts in McCulloch v. Maryland suggested, the prospect of a sin-
gle state (e.g., Maryland) having the power to frustrate the national will (e.g., the statute 
chartering the Second Bank of the United States) was a real possibility to contemporaries. 
Madison himself had signed the bill chartering the Bank after initially opposing it. 
181. Id. at 254.  
182. Id. at 255. 
183. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 21-22 (1817). 
184. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41, at 255.  
430 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:397 
state—officials and engineers handling the actual construction projects.185 
Again, Madison appeared to be taking a realist view based on what he regarded 
as the slow creep of congressional power over the past decades. He noted that 
an amendment granting the full jurisdictional power might be preferable given 
“the moral certainty, that it will be constructively assumed, with the sanction of 
the national will, and operate as an injurious precedent.”186 An amendment 
would avoid messy line-drawing exercises and would also permit a fresh start 
on firmer constitutional ground. If Congress was likely to accumulate power 
anyway, Madison suggested that it was better to cabin the power ex ante with a 
constitutional amendment. A “recorded precedent” that delineated the precise 
limits of Congress’s power over internal improvements was preferable to “con-
structive enlargements” of that power through expansive readings of Article I 
in its current form.187 
Madison’s final suggestion to Van Buren was an amendment with a poten-
tially greater reach beyond the realm of internal improvements than either of 
the previous two. This amendment proposed to revise the language of the Gen-
eral Welfare Clause in such a way as to settle the controversy about its scope 
that dated back to the Founding.188 In contrast to the views of Alexander Ham-
ilton and others, Madison had long argued that the clause ought to be under-
stood as an auxiliary to the enumerated powers—an enabling act that granted 
Congress the power to tax and spend to carry out its commerce, postal, mone-
tary, war, and other enumerated powers.189 At this point in the letter to Van 
Buren, Madison’s language took a more forceful tone: “[W]hilst the terms 
‘common defence & general welfare,’ remain in the Constitution, unguarded 
ag[ain]st the construction which has been contended for, a fund of power, inex-
haustible & wholly subversive of the equilibrium between the General and the 
State Gov[ernmen]ts is within the reach of the former,” he argued.190 To pre-
vent a vast (and, he suggested, unintended) expansion of federal power, Madi-
son suggested two solutions. One was to add a new amendment “expunging the 
phrase [‘common defence & general welfare’] which is not required for any 
harmless meaning”; the other was to “mak[e] it harmless” by adding to the end 
of the General Welfare Clause the limiting phrase “in the cases required by this 
 
185. The key here is the term “jurisdiction.” Madison described this grant of “jurisdic-
tion” as “a constitutional grant of the entire Power,” which he contrasted to a scenario in 
which the states “obtain[ed] the aid of the federal treasury for internal improvements . . . 
without interfering with the jurisdiction of the States.” Id. at 254-55. “Jurisdiction” suggest-
ed ongoing federal operation of the project, along the lines of the U.S. toll collectors sta-
tioned along the Cumberland Road. “Jurisdiction” meant a significantly greater federal pres-
ence than did appropriations. 
186. Id. at 255. 
187. Id. at 254. 
188. See MAIER, supra note 43, at 179-81 (discussing the disputes over the scope of 
Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers, including the General Welfare Clause, during the 
state ratification debates). 
189. See id. 
190. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren, supra note 41, at 255. 
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Constitution.”191 Either of these approaches would end the controversy about 
the scope of the taxing and spending authority. It was thus not an independent 
power, Madison claimed, but merely an aid to the (other, genuine) enumerated 
powers. 
Madison’s letter containing the proposed amendments crossed in the mail 
with a letter from Van Buren enclosing a new report from the Senate Commit-
tee on Roads and Canals. Aside from a brief, shared speculation as to George 
Washington’s attitudes toward internal improvements, correspondence between 
the two trailed off until 1830, when Madison revived it with his letter informing 
Van Buren that Jackson’s message accompanying the Maysville Road veto had 
not accurately captured the logic behind Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill. 
These discussions of internal improvements between 1826 and 1830 illus-
trate the struggles of actors as diverse as Jackson and Madison to establish a 
proper framework for understanding the internal power, and to create an appro-
priate constitutional box—textual, structural, and practical—in which the pow-
er might operate. Notably, each of them, like Monroe, supported a constitution-
al amendment granting Congress some power over internal improvements. 
Rather than continue the fight at the level of struggles over particular legisla-
tion, they thought in terms of revising and fixing the text, even if it meant en-
shrining a particular substantive view that was not their preferred approach. 
D. Roads III: Land to the States, Charters to the Corporations (1850) 
For some scholars, Jackson’s veto of the Maysville Road bill was the “be-
ginning of the end” of ambitious national programs of internal improve-
ments.192 Internal improvements bills continued to be debated in Congress, es-
pecially regarding public works involving rivers and harbors.193 While the era 
of the classic internal improvements bill for a canal or a turnpike had largely 
passed by the mid-1830s, the 1840s and 1850s brought new transportation 
technology as well as a distinct set of constitutional concerns and approaches. 
The growth of railroads raised some new issues and put a different emphasis on 
some old ones.194 Examining the debates in this period, in particular over the 
establishment of the Illinois Central Railroad (ICR) in 1850, illuminates the 
contemporary constitutional framework because it allows us to see a constitu-
tional work-around in action. That work-around was the mechanism of the fed-
eral land grant to a state for the purpose of establishing a railroad. 
 
191. Id. 
192. FELLER, supra note 62, at 141-42. 
193. For example, James K. Polk vetoed a major river and harbor improvements bill in 
1846. See S. JOURNAL, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 1209 (1846); see also ELLIS, supra note 151, at 
25 (discussing expenditures on lighthouses, rivers, and harbors during Jackson’s Administra-
tion); PETERSON, supra note 63, at 414 (discussing the Memphis Commercial Convention of 
1845, at which internal improvements were debated). 
194. See 4 TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 74-84 (describing the shift from roads, canals, and 
steamboats to railroads). 
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By the 1840s, politicians who supported internal improvements had begun 
to shift their focus from direct congressional regulation to land grants from 
Congress to the states. As the historian Yonatan Eyal puts it, a group of “devel-
opment-minded Democrats used land grants to skirt the question of the consti-
tutionality of federally sponsored internal improvements.”195 The grants oper-
ated in the following manner: 
Congress would donate public lands so that state governments themselves 
could use them for improvements. This would obviate endless controversy 
about the propriety of directly creating a road or lighthouse and would con-
tribute to the same goal of building up the new western states. When desirous 
of constructing a railroad, for example, Congress would grant alternate sec-
tions of public land for the project. The sections of land not donated could 
then be sold at a much higher price, since the availability of rail transportation 
nearby would make them suddenly more lucrative.196 
As a descriptive matter, the historical account tells us about a change in the le-
gal and political mechanism that interbellum Americans applied to internal im-
provements questions. Land grants were more appealing than substantive con-
gressional regulation—whether through appropriations or jurisdiction—
because they allowed for the construction of railroads while also honoring state 
sovereignty. 
But what was the constitutional framework underlying this change of 
mechanism? Why did early nineteenth-century Americans find land grants to 
states for the purpose of building railroads less objectionable than either federal 
funding for or federal construction of a railroad? Either approach presented op-
portunities for private profit and, in some cases, graft. To the extent that the 
land grants came with obligations, placed restrictions on how the states could 
go about building the railroad, and indeed required significant effort and in-
vestment from the state, why did contemporaries view them as preferable to 
federally directed programs resembling the Cumberland Road or Maysville 
Road plans, which might have cost some quantum of sovereignty but required 
less participation by the states? 
The debates surrounding the railroad land grants provide a rich case study 
of the interbellum constitutional landscape. In particular, the congressional de-
liberations concerning the establishment of the ICR in 1850 throw into relief 
contemporary conceptions of the commerce power, the spending power, and 
the Tenth Amendment. The congressional grant of federal public lands to the 
State of Illinois, which included a related grant to Mississippi and Alabama, on 
September 20, 1850, was the first of its kind.197 Drafted by Senator Stephen A. 
Douglas of Illinois, the bill was viewed by Douglas and others as an essential 
step in the program of building national infrastructure and expanding national 
 
195. YONATAN EYAL, THE YOUNG AMERICA MOVEMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1828-1861, at 47 (2007). 
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197. W.H. Allen, The Charter Tax of the Illinois Central Railroad, 6 J. POL. ECON. 353, 
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power across the continent.198 Within a few years, “a slew of bills proposing to 
grant public lands and rights-of-way for the building of railroads, canals, and 
telegraphs filled the dockets of Senate and House.”199 
Historians studying the 1840s and 1850s suggest that contemporaries 
viewed the land grants as a replacement for the less favored mechanism of sub-
stantive internal improvements regulation.200 The orthodox historiographical 
story has thus held that the land grants in some sense “solved” the decades-long 
controversy over internal improvements. Scholars, however, have not probed in 
depth what it was about the land grants that made them more palatable to con-
temporaries’ constitutional taste.201 The fact that nineteenth-century Americans 
adopted the land-grants approach suggests that they believed that an approach 
under which Congress used the states to build the railroads was constitution-
al—or, at any rate, less constitutionally problematic than the alternative ap-
proach. The alternative was for Congress to send federal engineers to build and 
run the railroads, akin to the proposed Maysville Road toll collectors.  
Yet concluding that contemporaries seem to have found the land grants 
more acceptable than direct regulation tells us little about why they might have 
held this view. It is not at all obvious that a commitment to robust federalism 
based on state sovereignty necessarily entails a preference for land grants to the 
states rather than direct congressional regulation. As the ICR debates illustrate, 
however, interbellum Americans adopted the land-grants approach because it 
satisfied key concerns that had plagued the previous three decades’ worth of 
internal improvements arguments. These concerns centered on the role of state 
consent, the appropriation-implementation and local-national distinctions, and 
the need for a constitutional amendment. The ICR debates also brought togeth-
er the issues of internal improvements and the status of the public lands, includ-
ing the permissible restrictions and conditions on land grants to the states and 
the responsibilities of the federal government as a proprietor of land. In short, 
contemporaries preferred land grants to direct federal regulation because land 
grants came closer to satisfying crucial interbellum concerns about how feder-
alism and, in particular, concurrent power should operate as a practical mat-
ter.202  
 
198. See EYAL, supra note 195, at 47-49. 
199. Id. at 49. 
200. See, e.g., id. at 47; GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION, supra note 11, at 170-
72; 4 TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 95-96.  
201. See generally EYAL, supra note 195, at 47 (describing Democrats as “us[ing] land 
grants to skirt the question of the constitutionality of federally sponsored internal improve-
ments”); GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION, supra note 11, at 170-72 (describing the 
ICR Act as “a sharp departure from . . . precedents and from the prevailing attitudes of the 
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was “regarded at the time as a special case, inevitably it set a precedent”). 
202. On concurrent power, see generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safe-
guard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 459 (2012) (arguing that state 
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434 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:397 
The land-grants approach relied on a few important background principles, 
chief among them the surveying and land-sale system established by the Ordi-
nance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the fact that new states 
were typically admitted by compact, and the occasionally controversial fact that 
the federal government retained ownership of large tracts of public lands within 
the borders of new states.203 The Ordinance of 1785 set the basic units of land: 
the township (six miles by six miles) and the section (one mile by one mile, or 
640 acres).204 In the Ordinance, the Confederation Congress also mandated that 
several lots in each township be “reserved for the United States.”205 Two years 
later, the Northwest Ordinance, one of the initial pieces of legislation passed by 
the First Congress, provided that the legislatures of new states “shall never in-
terfere with the primary disposal of the Soil by the United States in Congress 
Assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary for securing 
the title in such soil to the bonâ fide purchasers.”206 In the Ohio Enabling Act 
of 1802, according to which Congress granted Ohio permission to seek state-
hood, the federal government granted the new state certain lands for salt 
springs and schools. The foundational assumption behind the terms of admis-
sion, however, was that “the fee-simple to all the lands within its limits, except-
ing those previously granted or sold, should vest in the United States.”207 Con-
sequently, many of the states of the Old Northwest that joined the Union in the 
early nineteenth century contained large tracts of federal land at the time of 
their admission. The new sovereign states, in other words, accepted as a term of 
admission to the Union that the federal government would hold significant por-
tions of their land.208  
This land provided a hook for Congress to reach into the states and build 
railroads. In the act establishing the ICR, the sequence of transactions was 
clear: the statute announced itself as an act “granting the Right of Way, and 
making a Grant of Land to the States of Illinois, Mississippi, and Alabama, in 
Aid of the Construction of a Railroad from Chicago to Mobile.”209 Step one 
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was to grant the right-of-way to the state; step two was to grant land surround-
ing that right-of-way to the state. Congress was not appropriating funds for in-
ternal improvements, nor was it proposing ongoing federal involvement with 
the management of traffic on the nation’s roads. Instead, the Act invoked one 
of the most fundamental congressional powers: the power to dispose of public 
lands.210 This transfer of federal land to the states simply happened to come 
with a condition attached: it was “in aid of the construction of a Railroad”—or 
a “road,” as contemporaries typically referred to the projects.211 
As Eyal’s description suggests, the specific provisions of the grant of land 
to the state, and the reservation of a significant amount of other land to the fed-
eral government, were complex. The right-of-way provision was fairly straight-
forward: from the terminus of the Illinois and Michigan Canal near present-day 
Peru, in north-central Illinois, south to Cairo, Illinois, at the junction of the 
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, with branches eastward to Chicago and north-
westward to Galena, Illinois, and eventually Dubuque, Iowa.212 The alternate-
section requirement for the selection of the actual parcels of land was more 
complicated. It provided “[t]hat there be, and is hereby, granted to the State of 
Illinois, for the purpose of aiding in making the railroad and branches aforesaid, 
every alternate section of land designated by even numbers, for six sections in 
width on each side of said road and branches.”213 
The alternate sections would thus run perpendicular from the line of the 
railroad, each measuring one section (one mile) long and stretching six sections 
(six miles) outward in either direction from the right-of-way. The result was 
what was known as a “checkerboard” pattern of land ownership, for as one 
progressed along the right-of-way, each mile would potentially bring a new 
owner. In the immediate aftermath of the bill’s passage, and given the remote-
ness of the land at issue, ownership would for the most part alternate between 
the State of Illinois and the federal government. Here came the final piece of 
the congressional scheme: the double-price provision, according to which the 
land that remained in the hands of the United States could not be sold for less 
than double the minimum price of the public lands,214 or $2.50 per acre. 
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The ICR Act set some penalties for noncompliance by the State of Illinois. 
The Act began by stating that the lands in question “shall be applied to no other 
purpose whatsoever.”215 More pointedly, if the railroad was not completed 
within ten years, the Act required Illinois to remit to the federal government the 
proceeds of any of its sales of the land associated with the grant.216 The same 
terms were applied to Alabama and Mississippi pursuant to a section of the Act 
that established the Chicago and Mobile Railroad.217  
From a structural perspective, the land grants took an unusual form, as con-
temporaries acknowledged.218 The federal government possessed lands within 
the boundaries of some states that it proposed to transfer to the state on condi-
tion that the state use the lands for a specific purpose defined by Congress. 
These lands were located within states that had previously been federal territo-
ries, even though many in the newly sovereign states objected to this condition 
of statehood.219 In an 1846 debate on a similar plan for a railroad in Michigan, 
some senators had voiced “old Jacksonian” concerns about the project, arguing 
that the land grants were merely a cover for federal direction of internal im-
provements.220 By 1850, these concerns about federal expansion and en-
croachment on state power through land grants continued to haunt some legis-
lators. Others, however, had the opposite concern: that the grants were suspect 
because they allowed a single state to derive undue benefits from the people of 
the entire United States.221 
When the bill was debated in the Senate, the discussion focused on the 
broad issue of the relationship that the Act established among Congress, the 
State of Illinois, and the railroad company. Some senators objected to the alter-
nate-section and double-price provisions, which they viewed as creating exces-
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sive restrictions on the State of Illinois.222 They did not oppose the notion that 
Congress could grant the lands in the first place, or that the lands could be 
granted to a state provided that they were used for a specific purpose. Rather, 
their position was that if such a grant was to take place, the land ought to be 
given to the state—and its citizens—free from conditions. “The route, it is said, 
will be about four hundred miles in length, and the grant will be equivalent to a 
strip of land six miles wide throughout the whole length, or one million five 
hundred and thirty-six thousand acres of land,” Senator Isaac Walker of Wis-
consin noted.223 Under the terms of the ICR Act, “[o]n an equal amount of land 
it is proposed to increase the price to double the usual Government price.”224 
Walker condemned this increase in the price of certain federal lands as “a tax 
upon the actual settlers to that amount, in order to build this road.”225 Illinois-
ans would be burdened by the Act’s required price increase, a requirement that 
prompted Walker to question Congress’s motives. “If Government is going to 
be generous, let it be generous; but let it not speculate upon its own lands at the 
expense of those who are to settle upon them,” he argued.226  
For Walker and others, the Act was problematic not because it promoted 
internal improvements, or because it gave land to a state to be used for a rail-
road, but rather because it amounted to a federally imposed tax on settlers in 
that state who would pay double the pre-Act amount to purchase land within 
the zone of the railroad grant. As William Dawson of Georgia put it, “[W]here 
is the power in this Government to make a donation to A in a manner that 
presses B into paying double price? How is it that A became a beneficiary un-
der the Constitution, whilst you put a penalty upon B?”227 These critics of the 
Act were skeptical of arguments offered by Douglas and others that the plan 
would promote the public interest. They regarded it as an exploitation of the 
people of Illinois and a potential source of “embarrassment”—in the nine-
teenth-century sense of financial difficulty—for the state itself.228 
Other opponents of the ICR bill expressed discomfort with the premise that 
Congress possessed the power to grant 1.5 million acres of federal land to one 
state, even if Congress claimed that the benefits of the railroad would redound 
to the entire nation. The chief concern of these senators was therefore that it 
represented an improper use of the public domain to enrich a single state, at the 
expense of the federal government.229 If Congress was going to do something 
with the public lands, they suggested, it had to be for the benefit of “We the 
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People” of the United States, not simply for Illinois. Unlike the first group of 
critics, who argued that the ICR Act imposed the federal will on a state, these 
opponents of the Act suggested that a single state had captured the federal will 
and was using it selfishly, perhaps even to the detriment of the other states.230 
Their arguments thus sounded in the local-national distinction that Jackson had 
used to justify his veto of the Maysville Road bill. Instead of a beleaguered 
state populace suffering at the hands of an overweening federal government, 
they saw Illinois and its representatives as attempting to profit from Congress’s 
zeal for railroads. Dawson put the point in terms of the law of trusts:  
Can Congress give to Illinois under the cestui que trust, a million and a half of 
acres of land, and then turn round and tell the other States in the cestui que 
trust, we do it in order to benefit the whole of you? The question is, have we 
any such power? In my judgment, we have it not at all. The public property 
belongs to the entire people, and when we dispose of it we must dispose of it 
on that principle.231 
The bill’s supporters responded to these criticisms by wrapping themselves 
in the mantle of state sovereignty, while at the same time, and somewhat para-
doxically, dismissing the notion that the Act subjected Illinois to penalties, co-
ercion, or excessive requirements. James Shields of Illinois argued that “if the 
bill as it is will be any injury to Illinois, that injury will be for the benefit of the 
United States, and we who represent Illinois are responsible to our people for 
that injury.”232 In contrast to Shields’s effort to erect a barrier around the peo-
ple and State of Illinois, William Dayton of New Jersey took a more pragmatic 
view. “The State of Illinois is not bound to go on and construct this road,” he 
stated.233 “If you pass this act, she sees what she has before her, and accepts it 
or does not accept it. There is no obligation incident to the passage of this act 
that imposes any obligation upon her.”234 Dayton thus rejected the implicit ar-
gument of many of the Act’s opponents that the structure of the land grant had 
coercive force. The state could simply take it or leave it, he argued. 
Proponents of the program also characterized Congress as a beneficent 
proprietor of the public lands, a trustee with a duty to use the property for the 
benefit of the people. “I have never entertained the least doubt that the Gov-
ernment, being the large landholder of the country, had the right to dispose of, 
reserve, or improve the public domain,” commented Henry S. Foote of Missis-
sippi.235 Other advocates invoked the appropriation-jurisdiction distinction that 
had so powerfully influenced previous debates. Lewis Cass of Michigan insist-
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ed that there was “a fundamental difference between the principle of this bill 
and the Government carrying on a system of internal improvement.”236 Unlike 
the internal improvements bills of the 1820s and 1830s, “[t]here is no proposi-
tion in this bill that the Government should build the road; there is no assump-
tion of authority within the jurisdiction of the States for that purpose whatev-
er.”237 Moreover, echoing Dayton, Cass argued that the states were not even 
bound by the Act: “The jurisdiction is left entirely to the States to do as they 
please; to make the road or leave the road unmade.”238 Still others invoked the 
continental aspirations of the United States, referring to the ICR as “a great na-
tional thoroughfare.”239  
As the Senate debates demonstrate, the railroad land grants raised many of 
the same themes as had the controversies over roads and canals a few decades 
earlier. Throughout the ICR discussions, however, one familiar concept proved 
particularly significant, even as participants struggled to define it and determine 
its boundaries: the idea of state consent. It was a particularly powerful idea for 
opponents of the ICR bill, some who feared that the plan threatened the sover-
eignty of Illinois,240 and others who found on the part of Illinois a suspicious 
amount of consent, even eagerness, to take Congress’s bargain.241 As has been 
noted, nearly the entire Ohio congressional delegation supported the Cumber-
land Road bill in 1822,242 but that did not amount to the relevant form or quan-
tum of consent for President Monroe. The chief loser (or winner, depending on 
one’s perspective) from the ICR bill was Illinois, and Douglas’s ardent support 
both aided and hindered the bill’s passage because contemporaries identified 
the bill with the Senator.243 But perhaps the clearest, most concrete evidence of 
consent came in connection with the bill’s proposal to link the ICR with Mo-
bile, Alabama. After Douglas had met with local representatives of the Mobile 
and Ohio Railroad and decided to include Mississippi and Alabama in the draft 
bill, the legislatures of both states instructed their counterparts in the U.S. 
House and Senate to support the bill.244 Senator William R. King of Alabama 
introduced the amendment extending the railroad to Mobile. Was all this evi-
dence of consent by Mississippi and Alabama to a physical invasion by an in-
strumentality of the federal government? Or was it simply evidence of classic 
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nineteenth-century graft, in which the representatives of the southern states 
came to view the economic and political benefits of the railroad as outweighing 
their sovereignty concerns? For critics of the bill, both of these were plausible 
explanations. Insufficient state consent gave rise to fears of congressional over-
reach, while a surfeit of consent suggested that the state was funneling away 
more than its share of benefits from the Union and thus was not adhering to the 
rules of the Federal Republic. 
In the end, the ICR bill passed the House and Senate and was signed into 
law by President Millard Fillmore on September 20, 1850.245 A few months 
later, in February 1851, the Illinois Central Railroad Company received a char-
ter from the Illinois legislature.246 When construction of the railroad was com-
pleted in 1856, the right-of-way crossed—and raised the value of—a section of 
land along the Chicago lakefront that the railroad had purchased from Doug-
las.247 
III. THE LOST HISTORY OF THE SPENDING POWER? 
The debates over internal improvements legislation, from the Bonus Bill in 
1817 to the Illinois Central Railroad Act in 1850, suggest two important in-
sights for modern constitutional law.  
First, the factors that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have treated as 
essential to analyzing a particular regulation’s congruence with principles of 
federalism are not the same factors that early nineteenth-century commentators 
regarded as relevant. Second, the dramatic difference between interbellum and 
millennial reasoning about federalism challenges the Court’s reliance on a 
foundational distinction, unchanged since the Founding, between local and na-
tional activities. The history of constitutional thought in the early nineteenth 
century demonstrates that there is no single correct relationship between the 
general government and the states, with all deviations to be explained away as 
political-branch mistakes awaiting judicial correction. The internal improve-
ments debates, despite their untidy tacking from the appropriation-jurisdiction 
distinction to states’ consent and back, were not simply one view of the Consti-
tution. Between the Revolution and the Civil War, they were the Constitution. 
To understand why this is the case, consider the elements of federalism. In 
interbellum Americans’ analysis of internal improvements, as we have seen, the 
key factors were the consent of the states; the distinction between Congress’s 
power to appropriate funds for internal improvements and its power to imple-
ment and retain jurisdiction over those projects; and widespread acceptance of 
the idea that the Constitution could be amended to give Congress additional 
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enumerated powers. In the Court’s modern federalism analysis, however, these 
factors are largely irrelevant.  
The varying significance of state consent is best illustrated in the Court’s 
1992 decision in New York v. United States.248 In that case, a majority of the 
Court invalidated a federal provision requiring states that could not dispose of 
their own hazardous waste by a certain date to take title to the waste. The ma-
jority’s theory was that by requiring a state to assume ownership of the waste, 
Congress would in effect be “commandeering” the state treasury because it 
would be compelling the state to subsidize private parties—here, the producers 
of hazardous waste, who would be relieved of ownership and liability by the 
federal provision.249 “The take title provision offers state governments a 
‘choice’ of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the 
instructions of Congress,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the Court. 
“As we have seen, the Constitution does not empower Congress to subject state 
governments to this type of instruction.”250 The fact that New York had previ-
ously supported the regional waste compact containing the take-title provision 
was of no moment to the Court. “The constitutional authority of Congress can-
not be expanded by the ‘consent’ of the governmental unit whose domain is 
thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.”251 
It was not possible for New York to consent to what the Court regarded as a vi-
olation of New York’s sovereignty. “The Constitution does not protect the sov-
ereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract 
political entities,” Justice O’Connor wrote. “To the contrary, the Constitution 
divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of 
individuals.”252 In other words, state sovereignty requires that a state be pro-
hibited from waiving any portion of what the Court understands to be its Tenth 
Amendment rights.253 
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Moreover, in the early nineteenth century, the project of fleshing out pre-
cisely what federalism ought to look like in practice took place primarily in the 
political branches, in contrast to the modern Court’s suggestion that the judici-
ary is the best judge of what federalism requires. This point is implicit in New 
York, and it became explicit in NFIB, with the Roberts Court’s revival of the 
coercion inquiry in the context of the spending power analysis.254 Although 
one might plausibly think that the coercion analysis is simply a modern version 
of the early nineteenth-century consent inquiry, the Chief Justice’s opinion 
makes clear that the opposite of coercion is not consent by the state but rather 
the Court’s assessment that a particular spending program does not amount to 
“economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acqui-
esce.”255 We know lack of coercion when the Court sees it, not when we see 
consent from the state. 
To be sure, as NFIB demonstrates, modern federalism doctrine does view 
the states as having the power to consent to the “bargains” offered by congres-
sional conditional spending programs. Indeed, the fact that the Medicaid provi-
sion of the ACA threatened to strip states of pre-ACA Medicaid funds proved 
dispositive to the majority’s determination that the program was not the type of 
“relatively mild encouragement” typically associated with conditional spending 
programs but instead represented “a gun to the head.”256 In the majority’s 
view, the problem with the Medicaid provision was precisely that it did not of-
fer the states an opportunity to consent to a deal that might have culminated in 
the loss of their entire allotment of federal Medicaid funding. The focus of the 
Court’s analysis was a search not for an affirmative act of state consent but ra-
ther for the possibility of state coercion. 
But to the extent that notions of consent underpinned the Medicaid portion 
of the NFIB decision, we must distinguish between consent in the context of the 
conditional spending work-around on one hand and consent in the context of 
direct congressional regulation under Article I on the other hand. As modern 
federalism cases such as New York v. United States, Printz v. United States, and 
even Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority—and, of course, 
the portion of the NFIB decision that rejected the Commerce Clause and Neces-
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sary and Proper Clause justifications for the individual mandate—demonstrate, 
Congress can no longer use state consent as a defense against the charge that its 
regulation violates the Tenth Amendment. But this was not the case in the early 
nineteenth century. On the contrary, as the internal improvements debates 
demonstrate, the presence or absence of state consent was a vital ingredient in 
the interbellum assessment of congressional regulation under Article I. 
Similarly, the early nineteenth-century distinction between appropriations 
and implementation, and especially the belief that appropriations were constitu-
tionally less problematic, has no real analogue in modern doctrine. Consider 
Madison’s array of proposed amendments in his correspondence with Van Bu-
ren. His second proposal, to grant Congress the power to make appropriations 
that it would then turn over to the states, which the states in turn would then 
apply to road and canal projects, would raise red flags today.257 To the extent 
that it permitted Congress to order state legislatures to build roads and canals, 
the proposal would run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering 
principle.258 Moreover, the proposal would be difficult to justify as an exercise 
of the conditional spending power. Although Congress typically has more lati-
tude to affect state policy through a conditional spending program than through 
direct regulation, the lack of a condition in Madison’s scheme would foreclose 
that avenue.  
A different set of modern objections could be levied against Madison’s 
third proposal, which suggested granting Congress the power both to appropri-
ate funds for and to implement internal improvements projects. To be sure, 
such an approach would be less likely to run afoul of the Tenth Amendment in-
sofar as it does not involve Congress using the states to carry out a federal pro-
gram. On the contrary, state governments would be excluded from internal im-
provements projects, which would be carried out by federal officials. (Recall 
the Cumberland Road toll collectors.) But other modern doctrinal concerns 
about direct congressional regulation would then become relevant. Some inter-
nal improvements projects—for instance, a short stretch of road within a single 
state, such as the Maysville Road—would arguably be purely local in nature, 
absent any substantial effect on national markets. Such a situation would trigger 
the intuition underpinning the majority’s holding in NFIB that the individual 
mandate is beyond the scope of the commerce and necessary and proper pow-
ers.259 
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As these examples demonstrate, the fundamental constitutional relationship 
between Congress and the states, which is most clearly observed through the 
device of the spending power, has undergone profound change since the early 
nineteenth century. Constitutional interpretations that emerged in the course of 
conflict between members of Congress, and between Congress and the Presi-
dent, are largely absent from modern doctrine. To be sure, doctrine changes 
over time, and one cannot reasonably expect the same arguments to be made 
over the course of two centuries’ worth of case law. But the great silence sur-
rounding the early nineteenth century in modern doctrine is notable given the 
posture of the Court in recent decades. In the area of the spending power, as in 
the Tenth Amendment, the Court has frequently taken the position that the 
basic conditions of the federal-state relation have not changed, and indeed 
could not have changed, since the Founding era. Chief Justice Roberts’s opin-
ion in NFIB exemplified this approach: “The Framers gave Congress the power 
to regulate commerce, not to compel it, and for over 200 years both our deci-
sions and Congress’s actions have reflected this understanding.”260 
What are modern constitutional lawyers to make of the internal improve-
ments debates? One answer is that the debates tell us that we should listen to 
James Madison in order to understand that sometimes listening to James Madi-
son would amount to good historical work but bad lawyering. This is so not be-
cause Madison was wrong in some fundamental sense about the best way to 
implement the Constitution’s scheme of federalism, or because lawyers should 
not pay attention to history, or because old constitutional ideas are inherently 
suspect. But neither are old constitutional ideas inherently correct, especially 
when layers of old constitutional ideas must be sifted through and evaluated.261 
Rather, the point is that the Constitution of the early nineteenth century was not 
the Constitution of the twenty-first century, even with respect to provisions of 
the text that remained the same throughout that time.  
Indeed, even in the period from 1817 to 1851, the universe of constitutional 
possibility shifted. As the railroad debates demonstrate, by 1850, discussions of 
internal improvements were no longer focused on finding the right language for 
a constitutional amendment that most parties agreed would solve the problem. 
Instead of ambitious proposals to give Congress additional enumerated powers, 
 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (“Undoubtedly the scope of 
this [commerce] power must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and 
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and re-
mote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government.”); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852) (“Now the 
power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceed-
ingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single 
uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and 
some . . . as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessi-
ties of navigation.”). 
260. 132 S. Ct. at 2589 (third emphasis added). 
261. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 38 (2010). 
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Douglas and other supporters of land grants to the states framed their argu-
ments in more conservative terms that worked with the constitutional text and 
practice as it stood. From the 1810s to the 1830s, Presidents and members of 
Congress believed that they were living in an extension of the original constitu-
tional moment and therefore assumed that the Constitution was still open to rel-
atively easy amendment. By 1850, however, that moment had ended. Conse-
quently, supporters of internal improvements turned to work-arounds that fit 
with their sense of the constitutionally permissible options. These work-
arounds, such as the railroad land grants, in turn became part of the interbellum 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Land grants to railroads did in some sense solve the problem of internal 
improvements that had dogged American law and politics since the Founding. 
Applying the modern taxonomy of types of congressional regulation, the land 
grants look more like a conditional spending program than direct federal regu-
lation under the commerce power or the necessary and proper power. We can 
therefore say that direct regulation, and with it the growth of congressional 
power, was more difficult for early nineteenth-century Americans to agree on 
than were conditional spending programs that relied on the states to carry out 
specific projects.  
The modern concern with Congress’s ability to commandeer the states, and 
the resulting imperative for the Court to protect the states, thus did not have the 
resonance in the early nineteenth century that it has today. The interbellum 
worry about direct congressional implementation of internal improvements did 
not apply if the regulation was rooted in an enumerated power, and many 
members of Congress and several Presidents were willing to expand that list of 
powers through the process of constitutional amendment. Analogies to modern 
doctrine, then, are tempting but ultimately difficult to make. Yet it is precisely 
this disanalogy between the early nineteenth-century constitutional landscape 
and our own that offers valuable lessons for modern constitutional law. Even 
when modern doctrine can be analogized to arguments and debates from the 
long Founding period, the reasoning behind those preferences is not the same 
from that period to ours. Constitutional work-arounds flourish and change over 
time because the background rules and norms that they work around change 
over time. Understanding the doctrinal history that created and was created by 
the work-arounds provides a vital window into the universe of constitutional 
possibility at a specific time—and a cautionary tale for static or originalist ar-
guments about the nature of American federalism. 
